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ALEXANDER TSESIS*
Abstract: This Article discusses why the Thirteenth Amendment's reach
extends beyond the institution of slavery and has important implications
for civil liberties. The Amendment—in providing a mechanism to protect
fundamental rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence and
Preamble to the Constitution—not only ended slavery, but also created a
substantive assurance of freedom. This Article reviews Thirteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence and shows that, despite substantial narrowing after its
adoption, the Amendment is a source of sweeping constitutional power
for enacting federal civil rights legislation. The Article also distinguishes
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment from that under
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, demonstrating
that the Thirteenth Amendment is a viable, and at times preferable, alter-
native for civil rights reforms. Finally, the Article suggests that recent U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting congressional Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers has increased the import-
ance of the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative strategy for civil
rights legislation and litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment's significance extends beyond the
abolition of slavery.' It grants the federal government the authority to
prevent any contemporary civil rights abuses associated with involun-
tary servitude. The South's peculiar institution interfered with far more
than slaves' economic welfare. At a more specific level, owners pre-
vented slaves from making independent parental decisions, choosing
spouses, or freely traveling off plantations. The scope of the Thirteenth
Amendment concerns these and other interferences against autonomy,
and in many cases provides Congress with authority to prevent them.
My contention is that the Thirteenth Amendment ended all aspects of
slavery, which spread far outside the boundaries of plantation hus-
bandry into interstate commerce, government fiscal policy, and private
sales transactions. 2
'The Thirteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. Cons'''. amend. XIII.
2
 After the Civil War, Radical Republicans tied the end of slavery to increased protec-
tions of labor in general. Senator Henry 1Vilson of Massachusetts explained that slavery
degraded white and black working people: "1 tell you, sir, that the man who is the enemy of
the black laboring man is the enemy of the white laboring man the world over. The same
influences that go to keep down and crush down the rights of the poor black man bear
down and oppress the poor white laboring man." CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343
(1866). Representative George Julian, who like Wilson was an unflinching abolitionist and
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Radical Republicans, who were the driving force behind the Thir-
teenth Amendment, expected it to end all injustices related to invol-
untary servitude. 3
 They planted the Amendment's roots in the Decla-
ration of Independence and Preamble to the Constitution, which left
the task of fleshing out the ideal of universal freedom to later genera-
tions. The Thirteenth Amendment's first section guarantees the free-
dom from arbitrary domination, and its second section empowers
Congress to enact legislation protecting people's coequal liberty to es-
tablish meaningful lives. In this regard, the Thirteenth Amendment
was both a new beginning for the nation and a constructive means for
enforcing its foundational principles of liberty and general wellbeing.
The Amendment made the United States' founding aspiration of
equal liberty an enforceable right. 4
The historical context of the Thirteenth Amendment is the aboli-
tionist movement and the nation's decision to throw off its racist past.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, both the federal government's re-
calcitrance to use the Amendment and Southern evasion of it necessi-
tated the ratification of two additional Reconstruction Amendments. 5
Even then, reform was slow in coining.
advocate of free labor, regarded corporate exploitation as a problem existing side by side
with slavery. ''The rights of men are sacred, whether trampled down by southern slave-
drivers, the monopolists of the soil, the grinding power of corporate wealth, the legalized
robbery of a protective tariff, or the power of concentrated capital in alliance with labor-
saving machinery." GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS, 1840 TO 1872, at 322-
23 (Negro University Press 1970) (1884).
8 See Roberti Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew:.Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights
After the Civil Iii7/; 92 Am. 1-11sT. REV. 45, 47-48 (1987) (explaining that congressional Re-
publicans expected the Thirteenth Amendment to enable Congress to pass laws protecting
natural rights); Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper
Scope of Section 1931, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 564 (1989) (indicating that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
intended the Thirteenth Amendment to end private as well as public discrimination); Jaco-
bus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consunrmation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 174-75 (1951) (explaining
how the Thirteenth Amendment extended the federal legilative powers into matters that
had previously been left to the states); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A
Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539, 560-76 (2002) (providing a detailed
study of congressional debates preceding passage of the proposed Thirteenth Amend-
ment); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
437, 440 (1989) (stating that, "Nil addition to purely labor-based concerns, the thirteenth
amendment debates reflected themes such as racial equality, the importance of access to
education, the integrity of families, and the natural rights of mankind").
4
 See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORIMANI L. REV. 1335,
1350-51 (1997) (discussing the importance of aspirational principles to constitutional
fidelity).
6 U.S. CONS•. amends. XIV, XV.
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After years of narrow judicial construction, which made the Thir-
teenth Amendment a dead letter in all but peonage cases, the United
States Supreme Court revisited the Amendment's meaning during the
heyday of the civil rights movement. 6
 The landmark Jones it Alfred H.
Mayer Co. decision determined that the Thirteenth Amendment ex-
tends beyond uncompensated, forced labor. In fact, the Amendment's
second section enables Congress to pass federal legislation that is ra-
tionally related to ending any remaining badges and incidents of ser-
vitude, such as present-day trafficking of foreign workers as sex slaves
and coerced domestic servants.? The judiciary's role in evaluating
such legislation is to determine whether Congress has overstepped its
Section 2 enforcement authority. The judiciary's interpretation must
be partially historical, because it cannot be made without reference to
the United States' experience with slavery, and partially theoretical,
because it must chart the course for civil liberties.
Even though the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1865, its
jurisprudence is relatively nascent. Rules should develop in this field
as in other areas of common law. Issues will appear before judges
whose holdings will be based on the extant precedents and on consti-
tutional integrity. Further developments will test the reasoning of
lower court decisions. The role of theory in this process is to scruti-
nize the current topography and articulate a sense of direction in this
relatively uncharted territory.
Contemporary civil rights initiatives have predominantly relied
on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Mean-
while, the Thirteenth Amendment has fallen into virtual disuse. Re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, however, such as United States v. Morri-
son and United States v. Lopez, have eroded Fourteenth Amendment
6 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968); see Anti-Peonage Act, 14
Stat. 546 (1867). Justice David Brewer defined peonage "as a status or condition of com-
pulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is
indebtedness." Clyatt v. United States. 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905); see Pollock v. 'Williams, 322
U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("[t]he undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented
by the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of com-
pletely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States"); United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133, 146, 148-50 (1914) ("[clompulsion of such service by the constant fear of
imprisonment under the criminal laws" violates the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (finding a statute that compels labor to work off debt
an unconstitutional form of peonage that violated the Thirteenth Amendment).
7 See Mayer, 392 U.S. at 440-41.
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and Commerce Clause precedents and spurred interest in Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. 8
This Article examines what fundamental rights are protected by
the Thirteenth Amendment. The Amendment is a potent constitu-
tional provision that the Supreme Court has interpreted as a means for
protecting fundamental rights. The Thirteenth Amendment is uniquely
suited to confront civil rights violations that neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Commerce Clause can prevent. Unlike the Four-
teenth Amendment, which only protects against state-sponsored dis-
crimination, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits private and public
acts resulting in arbitrary deprivations of freedom. 9 This dual capacity
makes the Thirteenth Amendment an essential complement for civil
rights initiatives, even in circtunstances not involving economic harms. 0
In that respect, the Thirteenth Amendment also provides a more
direct approach to preventing discrimination than does the Com-
merce Clause. It is directed against human rights abuses, whereas the
Commerce Clause is primarily an economic provision that has been
grafted ingeniously into the civil rights arena." As a pragmatic matter,
See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (dis-
cussing Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
SCE The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (Tillie [Thirteenth A]mendment is
not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute dec-
laration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any pail of the United
States."); Jack Balkin, History Lesson. LEGAL AVE., July-Aug. 2002, at 44, 49 (stating that the
Thirteenth Amendment, like the Citizenship Clause, does not refer to state actions, and
therefore applies to private conduct); Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment
and Slavery in tire Global Economy, 102 CoLum. L. REV. 973, 1007 (2002) (asserting that be-
cause the Thirteenth Amendment lacks a state action requirement, it places substantive
restrictions on "private social and economic relationships"). The Fourteenth Amendment's
state action requirement is not new. It can be traced to postbellum cases. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875's prohibition against social
discrimination on public accommodations violated the state action requirement); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1882) (holding Congress exceeded its Fourteenth
Amendment Section 5 power when it passed a section of the Ku Klux Klan Act, "Ns • .. the
section of the law under consideration is directed exclusively against the action of private
persons, without reference to the laws of the Slate or their administration by her officers, we
are clear in the opinion that it is not warranted by any clause in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution"). Congress can prevent private party acts when individuals com-
mit them in cooperation with the stale. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794. 798-99
(1966). More recently, the Court has reiterated the state action requirement in striking
down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Morrison. 529 U.S. at 620-21.
10
 The Thirteenth Amendment can offer courts more guidance and provide legislators
with added certainty.
11
 See ALEXANDER Tsusis, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT & AMERICAN FREEDOM: A IA-
GAL HISTORY, ch. 6 (forthcoming Sept. 2004) (distinguishing between the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and Commerce Clause).
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the Supreme Court's recently' increased oversight of congressional
Commerce Clause authority has made the Thirteenth Amendment
even more important.°
This Article begins with a retrospective look at why the Thir-
teenth Amendment so drastically altered the Constitution by showing
that before its ratification, civil liberty was limited by the basic right of
possession.° As a result, even human lives were conceptualized in
commodification terms. Protecting slave owners' interest in human
chattel was even more important to the delegates of the Philadelphia
Constitutional Convention than adopting the Bill of Rights. The
Three-Fifths Clause, the Fugitive Slave Clause, and the twenty-year
protection on slave importation held more practical importance in
drafting an acceptable constitution than protecting speech, liberty; or
life. In fact, the Thirteenth Amendment went even further than the
Bill of Rights in securing the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
The Article then explores the extent to which the Thirty-Eighth Con-
gress, in 1864 and 1865, planned for the proposed Amendment to
create protections for universal liberty.''
Next, the Article explains the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment, beginning with its restrictive decisions
issued in the aftermath of Reconstruction and continuing through
the Court's most recent pronouncements involving the Amendment. 15
The Article then analyzes Court decisions limiting congressional
Commerce Clause authority in passing civil rights reforms and ex-
plains why those limitations are inapplicable to the Thirteenth
Amendment.I 6
 Correspondingly, the Article discusses holdings relying
on federalism to limit the scope of Congress's power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment and distinguishes the statutory spheres
12 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Con-
gress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce."); Lopez, 514 U.S, at 558-59 (holding Congress
may regulate three areas of commerce: "channels of interstate commerce"; "instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities"; and "those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce").
" See infra Part 1.
14 Sec infra Part H.
Is See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part IV. The Court recently found Congress overstepped its Commerce
Clause authority on several occasions, Morrison. 529 U.S. at 619 (discussing the Violence
Against Women Act); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68 (discussing the Gun Free School Zones Act).
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of the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments." The Article con-
cludes with a historical and theoretical analysis of how the Thirteenth
Amendment fits with existing privacy and liberty rights case law. 18
I. CONSTITUTION BEFORE THE THIRTEENTH AlIENDNIENT
Understanding how antithetical slavery was to United States ide-
als is a staring point to comprehending slavery's full effect on the
Constitution. The revolutionary generation was engrossed with creat-
ing a free republic. The Sons of Liberty rallied colonists against taxa-
tion without representation; Liberty Polls were assembly places; Pat-
rick Henry embodied the revolutionary project in his pithy statement
"Give me liberty or give me death"; and Thomas Paine believed Amer-
ica to be "the place where the principle of universal freedom could
take root." 19
 Slavery was so incompatible with colonial aspirations that.
revolutionaries often declared they were under the British yoke of
slavery.20
 Yet, revolutionaries turned a blind eye to the widespread en-
slavement of Africans and Native Americans. 21
 The first U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice, John jay, later recalled that even among North-
erners, "very few ... doubted the propriety and rectitude of" slavery.22
17
 Recent cases limiting Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 powers have dealt with a va-
riety of subjects. See, e.g., Bd, of Ti: of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(holding that Congress was not authorized under Section 5 to require states to abide by
the terms of the Americans with Disabilities Act because it infringed on state sovereign im-
munity); Kim& v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (stating that that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act contains "a clear statement of Congress' intent to
abrogate the States' immunity, but that the abrogation exceeded Congress' [constitu-
tional] authority"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. 518-19. 535-36 (1997) (deter-
mining that "appropriate legislation" in Section 5 means that Congress can only pass re-
medial legislation that "deters or remedies constitutional violations," but does not allow
Congress to create constitutional rights).
18 Sec infra Part V.
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD or LIREWIT 23-25 (1982); FORREST MCDoN-
AID, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUAI: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 'rum CoNsTntrilioN 10
(1985); Eric Foner, The Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. H tsr. 435, 439
(1994) (stating Paine's position on creating a free republic).
20 Sec BARRY ALAN SHAM, THE MI-111 of AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 289-91 (1994).
21 See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconcilia-
tion, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2002-
2003) (discussing the enslavement of Native Americans in the colonies).
22 William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slaymy, 77 Am, 1-11sT. REV. 81, 86
(1972) (quoting John Jay). Nevertheless, the revolution altered that dynamic in the North,
partly because slavery was an economic liability and partly because of Northern politicians'
realization that continued exploitation of slaves was hypocritical to the revolutionary pro-
ject. See id.
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The independence movement, particularly its New England con-
tingent, began to recognize that the implication of its vision extended
to blacks as well. Among its ranks were those who sought gradual
emancipation, such as John Adams, the nation's second president,
and those •
 who demanded immediate liberation, such as Nathaniel
Appleton, a member of the first Committee on Correspondence. 23
The 1774 Rhode Island law prohibiting slave importation proclaimed
that, among rights and liberties, "personal freedom must be consid-
ered as the greatest." 24
 Black leaders and some of their white counter-
parts, such as James Otis, recognized the opportunity to end slavery
offered by the Revolution. 23
 A group of black New Hampshire peti-
tioners used natural rights terminology to make the point "[t]hat
freedom is an inherent right of the human species ... [and t] hat pri-
vate or public tyranny and slavery are alike detestable."28 Similarly, on
April 20, 1773, black petitioners from Massachusetts expressed their
expectation of "great things from men who have made such a noble
stand against the designs of their fellow-men to enslave them."27 That
same year, blacks from Boston and other Massachusetts provinces pe-
titioned for relief from the manifold burdens placed on them by New
England slavery, decrying their lack of property, wives, children, city,
and country. 28
 Individuals of African descent helped shape such revo-
lutionary rhetoric. Lemuel Haynes, a racially mixed minister, wrote
23 Lorenzo J. Greene, Skive-Holding New England and Its Awakening, 13 J. NEGRO HtsT.
492, 524 (1928) (discussing John Adams's and Nathaniel Appleton's respective stances on
slavery).
24
 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, Winn: OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD InE NE-
GRO, 1550-1812, at 291 (1968) (quoting the preamble to the Rhode Island law); see John
M. Mecklin, The Evolution of the Slave Status in American Democracy, 2 J. NEGRO HIST. 105,
121 (1917) (mentioning the Rhode Island law). Rhode Island legislators, nevertheless,
considered blacks to be the equals of Native Americans, but not of white colonists. F.
Nwabueze Okoye, Chanel Slavery as the Nightmare of the American Revolution. 37 Wm. & MARY
Q. 3, 25 (1980).
25 James Otis considered both blacks and whites free and equal colonists. See Rosalie
Murphy Baum, Early-American Literature: Reassessing the Black Contribution, 27 EIGHTEENTD-
CENTURY STun. 533, 546-47 (1994); T.H. Breen, Subjccthood and Citizenship: The Context of
fames Otis's Radical Critique of John Locke, 71 NEW ENGL. Q. 378, 390 (1998) (comparing
Otis's philosophical outlook with that of John Locke). The ownership of humans, Otis
declared, "has a direct tendency to diminish the idea of the inestimable value of liberty."
Louis Hartz, Otis and Anti-Slavery Doctrine, 12 NEW. ENGL. Q. 745, 746 (1939).
26 JORDAN, supra note 24, at 291.
27 Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, and Revolutionary New England:
A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777, 62 NEW ENG. Q. 248, 255 (1989).
28 1d. at 252.
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that "an African., or, in other terms, ... a Negro, . , . has an undeniable
right to his Liberty."29
The ideal of universal freedom that many activists embraced re-
lied on the philosophy of John Locke. Locke's natural rights theory
made its way into the Declaration of Independence, but it did not end
slavery." The Declaration adopted Locke's statement of inalienable
human riOtts, unbeholden to positive laws. 31
 But the founding genera-
tion of American revolutionaries lived with the contradictory promises
of civil freedom and property rights in human chattel. In Thomas Jef-
ferson's original draft of the Declaration, his accusations against King
George included a clause condemning the British monarch for acting
"against human nature itself" by keeping open an international slave
trade that violated the "rights of life and liberty in the persons of a dis-
tant people."32
 South Carolina, which repeatedly appeared as a leader
in the antebellum proslavery camp, opposed the clause, and the lan-
guage was not retained in the Declaration's final draft."
In the decades between the ratification of the country's founding
documents and the Thirteenth Amendment, the Declaration's univer-
sal guarantee of freedom posed a moral dilemma for politicians and
citizens who tolerated and participated in an institution contrary to
core national commitments. Even without Jefferson's proposed an ti-
importation passage, the Declaration of Independence established lib-
erty as a primary national aspiration." Its terms created the rhetorical
29
 Ruth Sogin, "Liberty Further Extended": A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by Lemuel Haynes,
90 Wm. MARY Q. 85. 92 (1983).
59
 See HERBERT FRIEDENWALD, THE DECLARNDON or INDEPENDENCE 201-03 (Da Cap°
Press 1974) (1904); JtatomE Huvi.ER, LOCKE IN AND:RICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY or THE
FOUNDING ERA 209-11, 246-50 (1995); 'WILLARD STERNE RANDALL, TnomAs JErrERsoN: A
LIFE 205 (1993); Mowrom \Vitra, Tim PIIILOSOPIIY 01' TILE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 61-78
(1978); Donald Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L Rix. 52, 65 (1985); Terry Kogan, A Neo-
Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. Rix. 257, 307 (1990). But see GARRY
WILLS, INVEN'EING AMERICA: JEF•ERSON'S I) EC LA it A TI N OF INDEPENDENCE 172-75 (1978)
(arguing that Locke did not influence writing of Declaration of Independence).
31 See, e.g., 2 JonN Loma, Two TREATISES or GOVERNMENT § 22 (Peter Laslett ed„
Mentor Press 1997) •(1689).
32
 Tania Tedow, The Founders r? Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 Loy, J. Putt. INT. 'L. 1, 11
(2001) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's original draft of the
Declaration of Independence).
33
 WILLLAM W. FREEHLING, TIE, REINTEGRATION OF AMERICAN HIS TORY:  SLAVERY AND
DIE CIVIL WAR 26 (1994) (discussing South Carolina's opposition).
" See Joniv HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERN"E0 FREEDOM 85 (5th ed. 1980) ("The im-
plications of the Declaration, however vague, were so powerful that Southern slave owners
found it desirable to deny the self-evident truths which it expounded and were willing to
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dilemma of denying the otherwise universal right of freedom to per-
sons of African descent.35
The wording of the Declaration was so general, without any ac-
companying philosophical or policy explanation, that it only gained a
definitively antislavery significance during the Thirteenth Amend-
ment's ratification process. Until then, there were two differing camps
of thought. Shortly after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, one of its leading protagonists, em-
braced a perspective claiming that the Founding Fathers postponed
fully instituting the Declaration's principles until "a more propitious
time."36
 Stevens echoed the view adopted by a variety of antislavery
parties before the Civil War. For instance, the Liberty Party's 1844
platform asserted that the Declaration's principle that all men are en-
dowed with inalienable rights, including liberty; was embodied in the
Fifth Amendment's national protections of life, liberty, and property. 37
Because slavery deprived persons of all three without any due process
of law, the Liberty Party's platform declared that the institution was
"against natural rights." 38
The Republican Party, of which Stevens was a leader, likewise un-
derstood the Fifth Amendment's commitment to natural rights as a
guaranty for speaking out against the spread of slavery. The 1860 Re-
publican platform asserted that freedom was the normal state of
United States' territory. 39 Despite the Republican Party's 1856 platform
that "all men are endowed with inalienable right[s]," it only committed
itself to preventing the spread of slavery into the Western territories.°
This stance fell short of the full implications of its political philosophy.
Only in the midst of the Civil War did the Republican Party adopt the
position that slavery must be eradicated throughout the nation.
Before ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however,
proslavery forces manipulated the Fifth Amendment. Nineteenth cen-
do battle with the abolitionists during the period of strain and stress over just what the
Declaration meant with regard to society in nineteenth century America.").
65 Ste ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY
FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 43-44 (2002) (discussing how ethnological rationaliza-
tions were used to support claims of black inferiority).
66 CONC.. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2159 (1866).
3'7 Liberty Party Platform of 1844, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLA1TORMS, 1840-1960, at
5 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B. Johnson eds., 2d ed. 1961).
68 See id.
66 Republican Party Platform of 1860, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
37, at 32.
40 Republican Party Platform of 1856, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTS' PLATFORMS, supra note
37, at 27.
20041	 Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment
	 317
tury apologists for the expansion of slavery developed a political phi-
losophy that placed property at the pinnacle of personal interests and
regarded its protection as government's chief purpose. The Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause provided an artificial bastion
fortifying slavery against congressional action to limit its extension.
Based on this property rights centered ideology, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Dred Scott rx Sandford found that the Missouri Compromise un-
constitutionally violated substantive due process. 41
 Chief Justice Roger
B. Taney wrote that
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came.
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of
the United States, and who had committed no offence
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of
due process of law. 42
Taney further equated slaves with chattel, holding that nothing in the
Constitution enabled Congress to give less protection to slave prop-
erty than to any other form of property. 43
It seems that Taney's decision was intended to undermine the
universal applicability of the Declaration of Independence and Con-
gress's power to prevent the spread of slavery into the West. He did not
stand alone in his apparent wish to limit Congress's power to prevent
the spread of slavery, and he sided with the prejudices of other promi-
nent government officials. For example, during debates on the Kansas-
Nebraska Bill, Senator Albert G. Brown declared, "negroes are not
men, within the meaning of the Declaration. If they were, Madison,
and Jefferson, and Washington, all of whom lived and died slavehold-
ers, never could have made it, for they never regarded negroes as their
equals, in any respect."44
The ability of both camps to harness the Fifth Amendment for
opposite ends signals the importance of constitutional interpretation
in the historic struggle over slavery. 45
 Jacobus tenBroek, a historian of
the Reconstruction period, wrote that lolnce the constitutional start
ing point on either side was accepted, almost all else followed auto-
41
 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 452.
"Cow:. Gi.one, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 230 (1854).
43
 JACOBUS FENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER TIIE LAW 56 (Collier Books 1965) (1951),
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matically."46
 If slaves were merely property, then the Fifth Amendment
protected owners' property rights. Proslavery rhetoric, which the Ta-
ney Court accepted, relied on the natural or vested property rights
view that the federal government could not trump state control over
private economic interests. 47
 If slaves were humans, and the proslavery
argument a self-interested excuse for tyrannical exploitation, then the
Just Compensation Clause was inapplicable and the Due Process
Clause protected African American liberty. 4° The antislavery position
relied on the Fifth Amendment to expound a natural rights theory
against exploitation of persons and the misappropriation of funda-
mental interests in life and liberty 49
Ironically, the Framers' compromise on slavery, which they had
made to secure the Union, was almost its undoing. A number of out-
spoken supporters of abolition were among the men who drafted the
Constitution in Philadelphia. Benjamin Franklin was well known for
his antislavery views and was elected in 1787 as the president of the
Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the Re-
lief of Negroes Unlawfully Held in Bondage. 5° At the Constitutional
Convention the same year, George Mason and Gouverneur Morris
argued against continuing the slave trade." Some powerful South-
erners sided with Thomas Jefferson who wanted compensated, grad-
ual manumission.52
46 Id.
47
 Proponents of the proslavery position used substantive due process analysis to claim
that slave owners had a natural right to possess human chattel. See Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 318-19 (1988).
48 Id,
49 Id.
50 See OSCAR REISS, BLACKS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 176 (1997) (quoting a speech Ben-
jamin Franklin delivered as the president of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery); Stephen P. Holbrook & David B. Kopel, Tenth Coxe and the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823,7 Wm. & MARY BILL Km). 347, 357 (1999).
5I
	 Finkelman, Intentionalism the Founders. and Constitutional Interpretation, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 435, 465-66 (1996) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: Pot.rncs
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITI1I1ON (1996) (explaining Morris's and Ma-
son's opposition to slavery during the Constitutional Convention's debate over Congress's
future power over commerce)).
52 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Jared Sparks (Feb. 4, 1824), in 12 THE WORKS or Tito-
MAS JEFFERSON 334, 334-36 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); see 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OFJOIIN MARSHALL 473-79 (1919) (discussing Marshall's support for gradual, com-
pensated emancipation and African colonization). James Madison believed in gradual
emancipation, compensated from national funds because the benefits of liberation would
be national. ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION, SELECTED CHAPTERS 19 (1973).
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Economic interests, however, proved more powerful than ethical
ones. By the mid-eighteenth century, slavery was entrenched in both
the North and South. Northern shippers and merchants participated
in slave importation from the years preceding the Constitutional Con-
vention until 1808, when the slave trade legally ended." Northern
industrialists shipped Africans into the colonies and assured Southern
return on human capital by purchasing Southern goods. The North's
willingness to ship Africans provided the South with enough laborers
to turn a profit on what otherwise would have been fallow farmland.
The proslavery camp used its leverage at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention by demanding protections for slavery in exchange for rati-
fying the Constitution. The willingness to sacrifice human lives for the
sake of gaining the consent of South Carolinian and Georgian repre-
sentatives led the country away from the universal values of the Decla-
ration of Independence toward factional dogma, which often split on
the question of slavery." Those Northern and Upper Southern dele-
gates who had sought an immediate cessation of the trade gave in to
the Deep South's demands.
To their credit, the Founders provided avenues for formal politi-
cal change, including a method for proposing and amending the
Constitution with Article V, which Radical Republicans later used to
nullify the proslavery sections. However, the Founders did little to al-
ter oligarchical social relations that existed in their own time. They
granted a disproportionate amount of power to slave owners, rather
than immediately producing the representative democracy that the
Declaration heralded. 55
The Framers' lack of concern for the human rights of slaves was
reflected in numerous constitutional clauses. The constitutional con-
cessions to slavocracy were so extensive that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment profoundly altered United States laws and society. 5° The original
"Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little l'entured. Little Gained. 13 YALE J.L. &
Human. 413, 418 (2001) (explaining how South Carolina, North Carolina. and Georgia
reopened the slave trade and imported tens of thousands of slaves after the Revolution
and prior to the Constitutional Convention); Wolff, supra note 9, at 1011 (discussing how
Northern merchants and shippers played a key role in the importation of slaves between
1778 and 1808).
64
	 H. Sisuss, A DECADE OF SEC'llONAL CON'IROVERSY, 1851-1861, at 33-34
(1942) (discussing Georgia's and South Carolina's objection to giving Congress power over
slave commerce).
FREEIILINC. supra note 33, at 14. 16-18 (claiming that the American Revolutionists
intended a political but not a social revolution).
56
 Historian jack Rakove recently questioned whether the constitutional concessions to
South Carolina and Georgia were more extensive than was necessary to bring them into
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Constitution was marked by a glaring contradiction with its protection
of both liberty and slavery. In an article first published in 1850, Fre-
derick Douglass, who escaped from slavery in his youth and became a
renowned civil rights leader, brought out this contradiction:
If we adopt the preamble, with Liberty and Justice, we must
repudiate the enacting clauses, with Kidnapping and Slave-
holding. . .. Every slaveholder in the land stands perjured in
the sight of Heaven, when he swears his purpose to be, the
establishment of justice—the providing for the general wel-
fare, and the preservation of liberty to the people of this
country; for every such slaveholder knows that his whole life
gives an emphatic lie to his solemn vow. 57
Even though the Constitution did not use the terms "slave" or
"slavery," it contained numerous protections for the South's peculiar
institution. Instead, the clauses that legalized slavery used euphemisms
to refer to bondsmen—"person held to Service or Labour," "such per-
sons," and "other persons"—which made constitutional passage less
contentious and alteration easier. Douglass, writing in his The North Star
newspaper, listed the Importation Clause among those constitutional
provisions that furthered slaveholding." The Importation Clause pro-
hibited Congress from abolishing the international slave trade for
twenty years after state ratification of the Constitution." During that
period, the Importation Clause limited Congress's authority to levying a
ten-dollar head tax for each imported slave. Even though Congress
passed laws in 1818 and 1820 that severely punished participants of the
slave trade, calls for reopening the trade continued until the Civil War.
Supporters of the slave trade, particularly those from South Carolina
and Louisiana, sought to depress the prices of slaves by flooding the
market with them, thereby decreasing labor costs."
the Union, because those states had a significant interest in joining it. See RAKOVE. supra
note 51, at 58, 73-74, 93.
57 Frederick Douglass, NORTH STAR. Apr. 5, 1850, reprinted in VOICES FROM THE GATH-
ERING STORM: THE COM ING OF E. AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 40, 40-41 (Glenn M. Linden ed.,
2001) [hereinafter NORTH STAR]; see also Frederick Douglass, The Constitution and Slavery,
NOR111 STAR, Mar. 16, 1849, reprinted in 1 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUG-
LASS 361 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950) [hereinafter DOUGLASS WRITINGS]; FREDERICK
DouGLAss, The Revolution of 1848, Speech at West India Emancipation Celebration (Aug.
1, 1848), in Dotmi.Ass WurriNGs, supra, at 321.
59 NORTH STAR, supra note 57, at 40-41.
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I.
60
 Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An
Ofiginalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477, 556-57 (1998) (discussing provisions of the 1818
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Further, the Three-Fifths Clause 6' enabled the South to obtain a
"domineering representation" in the House of Representatives. 62
 This
provided Southern congressmen with the power to proffer proslavery
laws and the numbers to pass them. Another author recently pointed
out that the Three-Fifths Clause also had a direct effect on presidential
elections.° Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 granted each state presiden-
tial electors whose number was equal to the state's combined number
of senators and representatives. 64 The electors, who comprise the body
that votes for the president., played a consequential role in placing
slaveholders into the executive office instead of principled antislavery
advocates, as occurred in 1800 when Thomas Jefferson defeated John
Adams for the presidency and in seating Northerners willing to placate
the slave South, as was the case with James Buchanan's victory in 1856.
Other constitutional provisions guarded slave owners against re-
calcitrant slaves and required federal involvement in maintaining the
peculiar institution. The Insurrection Clause gave Congress power to
call up the militia to suppress revolts, including slave rebellions such as
the Nat Turner Rebellion.° The Fugitive Slave Clause, which passed
without any dissenting votes at the Constitutional Convention, required
fugitives to be returned "on demand" and prohibited free states from
and 1820 statutes); see also P.L. Rainwater, Economic Benefits of Secession: Opinions in Missis-
sippi in the 1850s,11 S. H Isl .. 459, 467 (1935) (discussinglefferson Davis's desire to modify
the law of 1819 and repeal the 1820 piracy act because of the adverse affect an slave im-
portation); Harvey Wish, The Revival of the African Slave Trade in the United States, 1856-1860,
27 Miss. VALLEY HisT. Rio/. 569, 569, 572 (1941) (discussing how in the years immediately
preceding the Civil War powerful forces, particularly in Louisiana and South Carolina,
were on the verge of reopening the slave trade to gain more laborers).
61
 The Three-Fifths Clause provided that slaves were to be counted as three-fifths of a
person for the purpose of determining how many representatives a state was to have hi Con-
gress. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
Sec Michael Kent Curtis, A Story for All Seasons: Akhil Reed Amor on the Bill of Rights, 8
WM, R MARY BILL Wis. J. 437, 453 (2000) (book review) (explaining that the Three-Fifths
Clause gave the South a disproportionate representation in the House of Representatives);
John Rockwell Snowden et al., American Indian Sovereignty and Naturalization: It's a Race
Thing, 80 NER. L. REV. 171, 195 (2001) (pointing out that Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also excluded untaxed Indians from the numeration); cf. Ruth Colker, The
SUP7VPIC COIIH's Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 795 (2002)
(explaining that the Thirteenth Amendment's repeal of the Three-Fifths Clause and argil-
able grant of citizenship to slaves further increased the South's representation in Congress).
63
 Paul Finkelman, The Color of Laru, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 971 (1993) (reviewing AN-
DREW KULI„ TIIE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)).
64 Cf. id, (explaining that the Constitution provided for the indirect election of the
president through an electoral college).
65
 U.S. CoNs•r. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (giving Congress the power to 'provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions").
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liberating them.°° Frederick Douglass denounced the provision for
making "the whole land one vast hunting ground for men," making
felons out of persons who broke the fetters of slavery.°
This superabundance of slaveholding compromises made the Thir-
teenth Amendment critical, not only to ending the physical bondage of
slaves, but also to liberating the entire Constitution. The amendment
provision in Article V requires two-thirds of both congressional houses to
propose an amendment and three-fourths of state legislatures or conven-
tions to ratify it. This made the passage of an antislavery amendment
wholly impossible in the United States before the Civil War, because, in
1860, slavery was legal in fifteen of the thirty-three states then in the
Union.68
 The Thirteenth Amendment rendered all clauses directly
dealing with slavery null and altered the meaning of other clauses that
originally had been designed to protect the institution of slavery, such
as the Insurrection Clause, to exclude their original design.
The Thirteenth Amendment further reinterpreted the Declara-
tion of Independence to apply the universal declaration of human
rights to blacks, whites, and any other citizens. Until its ratification,
abolitionists like Charles Sumner, who argued that Fifth Amendment
66 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that "Enlo Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due"); see DON E. FEIIREN-
BACHER, SLAVERY, LW & POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HIS'IDRICAL PERSPECTIVE
20-21 (1981) (disputing that the Fugitive Slave Clause was indispensable to the success of
the Constitutional Convention); Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's
Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VANE). L. REV. 93, 121 (1989) (asserting
that the Fugitive Slave Clause did not arouse much debate at the Constitutional Conven-
tion because it was not a significant issue); Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylva-
nia, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 613 (1993) (asserting that although the Initial response" to
South Carolina's proposed fugitive slave provision "was hostile." the Constitutional Con-
vention "with neither debate nor formal vote, adopted the fugitive slave provision as a
separate article of the draft constitution"); see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 625-26 (1842) (overturning Edward Prigg's conviction under state law for kidnapping
a black mother and her children in order to return them to a Maryland owner).
67 Frederick Douglass, Farewell Speech to the British People (Mar. 30, 1847), in DouGLAss
WRITINGS, supra note 57, at 209.
68 1n 1860, there were fifteen slave states and eighteen free states. Paul Finkelman, The
Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Development, 68 CIII.-KENT L. Rev. 1009,
1024 (1993); Robert R. Russel, The General Effects of Slavery upon Southern Economic Progress, 4
J. S. 1-11s -r. 34, 40 (1938); see Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of Otiginalism:
Clarence Thomas at the Rubicon, 16 L. I. 429, 469 (1998) (arguing that Article V can be
viewed as "the Framers' insurance policy against the possibility that then-excluded groups,
including women, slaves and free blacks, could one day change the power structure the
Founders had erected without regard to the needs, views, or priorities of the members of
those groups").
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guarantees applied to blacks and whites, held this view in the face of
explicit constitutional provisions to the contrary.° Antebellum efforts
to restrict slavery were ingenious but limited in scope. In 1850, Con-
gress used its Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 authority over the nation's
capital to prohibit slave trading, but not slavery, in Washington, D.C.; 7°
legislators, however, could not do the same in the bordering states.
Antislavery advocates faced the dogma that states had the exclu-
sive right to determine matters about slavery. The proslavery camp
typically grounded its assertion on the Tenth Amendment's reserva-
tion of powers to the state or Article IV's guarantee of a republican
form of government. Senator John Calhoun, the leading nineteenth-
century states' rights advocate, refined this proslavery concept into
the doctrine of concurrent majorities. He argued that the national
government lacked the authority to regulate slavery because it was
unable to gain support from each state to do so. 71
The abolitionist movement responded to this proslavery ideology
with a natural rights perspective that was grounded in the Declaration of
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. Abolitionists aimed
to dismantle the Constitution's tolerance for slaver); and their political
agenda gradually led to ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
II. ABOLITION AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Before turning to judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, I begin with a retrospective look at the Amendment's founda-
tional aims. This background is necessary for my later dichotomization
between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and between the
Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause.
Radical Republicans based the Thirteenth Amendment on the
natural rights principles that guided the abolitionist. movement from
its founding in 1833.72
 The movement was founded upon ideology
opposing both the proslavery and gradualist antislavery camps. Uni-
69 See TENBROEK, supra note 45, at 56; NIICIIAEL VORENBERG, FINAL. FREEDOM; THE CIVIL
WAR, THE ABOLI'IlON OF SLAVERY, AND 'niETIIIRTEEN'Ill AMENDMENT 106-07 (2001).
" Compromise of 1850, ch. 63, 9 Stat. 467.
71
 MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN 'nit; WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITU'llONAL
FAILURE 54 (1998).
72
 The American Anti-Slavery Society's 1833 Declaration of Sentiments, at hitp://wi,vw.
etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/antislavery.litin
 (last visited Feb. 6, 2004), was an early exam-
ple. Cf. John P. Diggins, Slavery. Race, and Equality: Jefftrson and the Pathos of Enlightenment,
28 Am. Q. 206, 222 (1976) (explaining that abolitionists found the natural rights theory
problematic because it did not separate human rights from property rights, and it lacked a
social responsibilities component),
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tarian leader William Eller),
 Channing explained, in 1835, that the
abolitionists' argument rested on the Declaration of Independence's
assertion of "the indestructible rights of every human being. "75 Each
person was "horn to be free," and the desire for wealth, especially in
human capital, could never trump individual rights. 74 Slavery was in-
imical because it stripped "man of the fundamental right to inquire
into, consult, and seek his own happiness." 75
The oratory and research skill of Theodore D. Weld likewise pro-
moted the movement's broad-ranging aspirations for national libera-
tion. Through his influential book, American Slavery As It Is, Weld passed
on to Radical Republicans the view that slaveholders plundered slaves
of their "bodies and minds, their time and liberty and earnings, their
free speech and rights of conscience, their right to acquire knowledge,
and property, and reputation." 76
 The National Anti-Slavery Convention
relied on the "self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence
... and in the Golden Rule of the Gospel—nothing more, nothing
less."" The abolitionists in Congress echoed the same sentiments.
Senator Charles Sumner's arguments during the debates on the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill were representative of the ideas he also espoused
during the Senate debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. "Slavery,"
he stated in one speech, "is an infraction of the immutable law of na-
ture, and, as such, cannot be considered a natural incident to any sov-
ereignty, especially in a country which has solemnly declared, in its
Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right of all men to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 78
The Thirteenth Amendment's grant of power to Congress over
matters resembling the incidents of servitude signaled a break from
moderate antislavery leanings and a preference for radical abolitionist
principles. 79
 Moderates wanted states gradually and separately to end
slavery. With the outbreak of the Civil War, however, a radical form of
73 11,1wAm E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 47-48 (Arno Press 1969) (3d ed. 1835).
74 Id. at 48.
75 Id. at 51.
76 THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS 7-8 (Arno Press 1968) (1839).
" The National Anti-Slavery Standard, February 21, 1857, quoted in William E. Nelson,
The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century
America, 87 DARN. L REV. 513, 536 (1974).
76 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 268 (1854).
79 See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITLMON: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND LAW or THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 97-99 (1993).
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abolitionism came to dominate Congress. 8° Even Abraham Lincoln,
who also thought slavery was "a total violation" of the Declaration of
Independence, initially maintained a gradualist, state-by-state ap-
proach. His views changed only during the War when he realized that
Southern states would not be appeased into abandoning their expan-
sionist ambitions,81
The Declaration takes for granted that the possession of natural
rights is "self-evident." 82
 Implicitly, this means people are intuitively
empathetic and can recognize that others are endowed with the same
rights. An advocate of the Thirteenth Amendment detailed a similar
view during the House debate on the proposed Amendment:
What vested rights so high or so sacred as a man's right to
himself, to his wife and children, to his liberty; and to the
fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers declare that.
those rights were inalienable? And if a man cannot himself al-
ienate those rights, how can another man alienate them with-
out being himself a robber of the vested rights of his brother-
man?83
Slavery was an anomaly in a country formed in opposition to British
violation of American civil liberties. Within this national context, the
Thirteenth Amendment brought the Constitution, which originally
protected the institution of slavery, into harmony with the Declaration
w On the House side, Thaddeus Stevens was the leader of the Committee on the Ways
and Means during the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, and, then, the Committee
on Appropriations during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. SecJames A. Wood-
burn, The Attitude of Thaddeus Stevens Toward the Conduct of the Civil 12 Am. IltsT. REV,
567, 567 (1907); Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, at littp://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.plThlex=S000887
 (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). Charles
Sumner was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1861. Mark
M. Krug, The Republican Party and the Emancipation Proclamation, 48 J. NEGRO His••. 98, 103
(1963). Henry Wilson was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Services and the
Militia. Id. Even more moderate leaders in the Republican Party, like Senator Lyman
Trumbull, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, rejected gradual abolitionism. See,
e.g., CONG. Gioia, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (arguing the Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery in all states and destroyed all incidents to slavery),
81
 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas, in Tut: WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 209 (Arthur B, Lapsleystl., 1905) (1854).
82
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), The Declaration recog-
nizes the existence of three natural rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. ALLEN
C. GUELZO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: REDEEMER PRESIDENT 224 (1999).
83
 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865) (quoting Representative John F. Farns-
worth).
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of Inclependence. 84
 Charles Black has pointed out that Thirteenth
Amendment principles were dormant in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.85
 Abolitionists changed legal culture to accord with ideals
that existed since 1776.
Radical congressmen used the amendment process under Article
V of the Constitution to alter the Constitution's initially inimical pro-
visions. The Thirteenth Amendment provides an enforceable right for
the protection of those civil liberties that were valued in the Declara-
tion of Independence but not implemented by the Constitution, The
Amendment allows Congress to secure liberty, life, and the pursuit of
happiness through positive laws.88
Behind its enforceable provisions lies the national commitment
to secure personal liberties integral to civil welfare. Progressive advo-
cates of the first reconstruction amendment made an earnest effort to
remove impediments standing in the way of civil rights. They re-
garded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of restoring the natu-
ral rights long denied to both blacks and wage earners. According to
Radical Republicans, former slaves were not only freed from bondage;
they also had gained the right to make fundamental choices about
their jobs and families. Congressman M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylva-
nia expressed the same point in general, rhetorical terms:
[IV] hat kind of freedom is that which is given by the amend-
ment of the Constitution, if it is confined simply to the ex-
emption of the freedom from sale and barter? Do you give
freedom to a man when you allow him to be deprived of those
great natural rights to which every man is entitled by nature? 87
The Thirty-Ninth Congress opened in 1865 with a statement by
Schuyler Colfax, the incoming Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Given shortly after Congress passed the proposed Thirteenth Amend-
ment and before the introduction of the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the statement was indicative of how Congress planned to use the
Thirteenth Amendment for Reconstruction. Colfax told the House:
W.R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1867, at
266-69 (1963); cf. STAUGHTON LEND, CI-ASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITF.D STATES
CONSTITUTION 185-213 (1967) (discussing the question of slavery and the Constitutional
Convention) .
28 Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86
CoLum. L. REV. 1103,1103 (1986).
86 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1864) (quoting Godlove S. Ortli, who ar-
gued for a practical application of natural rights principles via the Thirteenth Amendment).
87
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866).
2004)	 Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment
	 327
[I] t is yours to mature and enact legislation which, ... shall
establish [state gOvernments] anew on such a basis of endur-
ing justice as will guarantee all necessary safeguards to the
people, and afford what our Magna Charta, the Declaration
of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of govern-
ment--protection of all men in their inalienable rights.°
RadiCal Republicans relied on the Declaration of Independence
to elucidate the proposed amendment. Representative Godlove S.
Orth from Indiana expected the Amendment to "be a practical appli-
cation of that self-evident truth," of the Declaration "'that [all men]
are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' " 89 Its more
progressive advocates made an earnest effort to remove impediments
standing in the way of human rights." Representative Francis W. Kel-
logg of Michigan traced the sources of the proposed amendment to
the Declaration and to the Preamble of the Constitution's requirement
that government promote the general welfare and secure lifierty. 91
Illinois Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll, who was elected to the
Thirty-Eighth Congress to fill the vacancy created by the death of leg-
endary abolitionist Owen Lovejoy, voiced the desire to secure slaves
natural and inalienable rights because blacks have a right to "live in a
state of freedom."92 He asserted that they have a right to profit from
their labors and to enjoy conjugal happiness without fear of forced
separations at the behest of uncompassionate masters.° Moreover,
Ingersoll viewed the proposed amendment to apply to "the seven mil-
lions of poor white people who live in the slave States but who have
ever been deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of ... slav-
ery. Slavery has kept them in ignorance, in poverty and in degrada-
tion."94
 Senator Henry Wilson likewise said the Thirteenth Amend-
ment would provide "sacred rights" to whites and blacks. 93
Representative Thomas T. Davis of New York expounded on civil
liberty on January 7, 1865: "Liberty, that civil and religious liberty
which was so clearly beautifully defined in the Declaration of Inde-
813 CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1865).
CONG. Guo-. , 38th Cong., al Sess. 142 (1865).
9° Co.NG CLOnE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864).
01 Id. at 2954-55.
92 /4. at 2990.
03 Id.
" Id.
CoNG. C.t.ofo.., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
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pendence 	 kfrican slaver); was regarded as temporary in its char-
acter .... Our fathers predicted that the time would soon come when
the interests of the country would demand that slavery should pass
away."96
 Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois thought the "old
fathers who made the Constitution ... believed that slavery was at war
with the rights of human nature."97
Republicans like Representative Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota
recognized that
slavery is not confined to any precise condition. ... Slavery
consists in a deprivation of natural rights. A man may be a
slave for a term of years as fully as though he were held for
life; he may be a slave when deprived of a portion of the
wages of his labor as fully as if deprived of all.98
Senator John Sherman of Ohio regarded the Amendment's second
clause to be the grant of congressional power to actively secure freed-
people their liberty rights "to sue and be sued ... [and] to testify in a
court of justice."99
The Thirty-Eighth Congress wanted the Thirteenth Amendment
to help achieve the liberty they extolled during the debates of 1864
and 1865. The Amendment's second section made enforceable the
right to liberty. It placed the power to protect civil rights in the hands
of federal legislators, shifting the balance of power from the states. Yet
Supreme Court decisions that followed Reconstruction made the
Amendment virtually ineffectual, and it was only at the end of the
twentieth century that the Court corrected itself.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The Framers of the Thirteenth Amendment were driven by the
conviction that slavery was an evil requiring permanent eradication.m
96 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2(1 Sess. 154 (1864). Likewise, during the Senate debate,
Reverdy Johnson, who had represented one of Dred Scott's owners, argued that if the
Framers had known how much sectional strife would result from slavery, they would have
opposed it. The Anti-Slavery Amendment to the Constitution. Eloquent Speech of Reverdy Johnson.
He Takes Strong Ground for Immediate Emancipation,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1864, at 1.
97 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (1864). Representative William D. Kelley of
Pennsylvania, however, thought the errors of the Founding Fathers for compromising with
wrongs were being expiated by blood, agony, and death. Id. at 2983.
98 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 588 (1866).
99 CONG. GLOIIE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865).
100 There have been a number of in-depth studies on the congressional debates. TEN-
BROEK. SUM note 45, at chs. 9 & 10; Tsrsts, supra note 11, at ch. 2; VORENBERG, supra note
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In the years following Reconstruction, the U.S. Supreme Court un-
dermined the Radical ideals of universal freedom and, eventually, in-
terpreted the Amendment so narrowly that its holdings came to re-
semble the reasoning of congressmen who had voted against the
Amendment.m In the years following the Compromise of 1877, the
Supreme Court stripped the Amendment of its countermajoritarian
potentia1. 1 °2
 Only during the 1960s' civil rights movement did the
Court recognize its mistake.
A. Judicial Overview
A Kentucky federal court's 1866 decision in United States v. Rhodes
was the first federal decision on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which Congress passed pursuant. to its Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement authority 103
 Congress passed the Civil Rights
69, at ch. 4; G. Sidney Buchanan. The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 12 Hons. L. REV, 1, 7-14 (1974); Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth
Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L, REV. 1, 6-11 (1995).
101
 Pamela Brandwein, Slavery As an Intopretive Issue in the Reconstruction Congress, 34
LAW & Soc'v REV. 315, 316, 354-55 (2000) (analyzing the Northern Democratic view, ex-
pressed during the 1864 and 1865 debates, for a limited reading of the Thirteenth
Amendment and linking it to later Supreme Court opinions).
1 ° 2
 President Rutherford B. Hayes entered the Compromise of 1877. It was an agree-
ment between Democrats and Republicans giving Hayes, rather than Samuel J. Tilden, the
presidential election of 1876, in exchange for Hayes's agreement to withdraw federal
troops from the South, thereby effectively ending what remained of Reconstruction. See
GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE EMBODIMENT or FREEDOM IN
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 160 (1987) (discussing the regressive effect of the Com-
promise on civil rights efforts). G. Sidney Buchanan, a legal historian, examined the ef-
fects of the Compromise of 1877 on judicial decisions. finding that they extended further
than the immediate congressional abandonment of Reconstruction legislation. Buchanan,
supra note 100, at 367. The Supreme Court, too, having sent the key member to the elec-
tion committee, began determining opinions in line with the Compromise of 1877. Sec id.
at 367-68. Subsequent Court decisions became more averse to federal civil rights jurisdic-
tion, until the Thirteenth Amendment was a hollow guarantee, remaining practically un-
enforceable. Sec id. at 367.
1" 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866). Shortly after the States ratified the Thirteenth
Amendment, and before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed four
statutes to enforce it. Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Act of February 5,
1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding the scope of habeas corpus statutes); Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Slave Kidnapping Act, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866). These
laws were radical departures from antebellum legal thought and speak loudest against the
revisionist claim that the Thirteenth Amendment meant no more "for the Negro than
exemption from slavery." Sec JAMES Z. GEORGE, THE POLEEICAL HIS'IORY Or SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATEs 114 (Negro University Press 1969) (1915) (claiming a limited scope
for the Thirteenth Amendment).
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Act over President Andrew Johnson's veto. 10" The provisions of the Civil
Rights Act were indicative of the Radical Republican Reconstruction
plans. Senator Lyman Trumbull reported the Bill, on January 12,
1866. 1 " In its initial form, the Bill conferred citizenship on all persons,
except untaxed Indians, who inhabited the states or territories and
made it a crime to discriminate against their civil rights and immuni-
ties.'" The initial Bill essentially guaranteed equal enjoyment of the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, but this language was removed
from the Bill's final draft. Nevertheless, in its enacted form the Act rec-
ognized the civil rights to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-
erty, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other,
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding. 107
The Act granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases of any al-
leged violations.'" Moreover, anyone who was denied the right to en-
force his or her rights under the Act in a state court was permitted to
transfer the case to a federal court. State officials who violated the Act
under color of law or pursuant to custom were also subject to criminal
1 °4 Johnson vetoed the measure despite the urging of leading moderate Republicans.
Sec Letter from Ohio Governor Jacob D. Cox to Andrew Johnson (Mar. 22, 1866), in 10
THE PAPERS OF ANDREW JOHNSON 287 (Paul H. Bergeron et al. eds., 1992). A note to the
same effect from Secretary of State William Seward is filed under the date of March 27,
1866 in ANDREW JOHNSON PAPERS Reel 21 and housed at the Library of Congress. Con-
gress overrode Johnson's veto by a vote of 33 Senators for and 15 against, and the House
overrode his veto by a vote of 122 for and 41 against, GONG, GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1809 (1866) (Senate vote); id. at 1861 (1-louse vote). For Johnson's explanation of the
reasoning behind his veto. see 8 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES & PAPERS OF TIIE PRESI-
DENTS 3603 ( James D. Richardson ed.. 1897), The Civil Rights Act's reach was national,
unlike the Freedman's Bureau Act, a Reconstruction statute and a temporary wartime
measure with no application outside the rebel states. SecFreedman's Bureau Act of July 16,
1866, ch. 200, § 14, 14 Stat. 176 (1866),
CoNc, Guntr, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-12 (1866).
I" Id.
"7 Civil Rights Act of 1866. 14 Stat. 27.
1 " Id. § 3.
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prosecution. 109
 Violators were subject to imprisonment for up to one
year and a fine of no more than $1000. 110
Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as a designated cir-
cuit court justice in 1866, rendered the opinion in Rhodes)" The case
arose after white defendants were charged with committing burglary
against Nancy Talbot, an African American. 112
 Justice Swayne found
that the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass
the Civil Rights Act and federal courts the power to hear civil rights
matters. 113
 This was necessary to secure equal access to judicial redress
for newly freed blacks in both criminal and civil cases.'" Justice
Swayne's decision was seeped with "the spirit in which the Amend-
ment is to be interpreted." 115
 Without congressional enforcement
power, Justice Swayne wrote in dictum, "simple abolition . . would
have been a phantom of delusion." 110
In 1872, while Justice Swayne was still an associate justice, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled very differently on a procedural matter in
Blyew v. United States)" just as Rhodes, Blyew was a federal removal case.
Kentucky law, in 1868, when the Blyew defendants were indicted, still
forbade black witnesses from testifying against white defenclarns. 118
Blyew was the first. blow to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment for
ending centuries of racial intolerance. There was both oral and physi-
cal evidence at trial showing that on one night John Blyew and George
1°9 Id.
no Id.§§ 5,6.
In 27 F. Cas. 785. justice Swayne heard this matter in federal court because Kentucky law
forbade blacks from testifying against whites in state courts. Id. at 785-86. He was an estab-
lished abolitionist even before the Civil War, and at one time he freed slaves he and his wife
had received by marriage. josErn FLETCHER BRENNAN, 1 THE (OHIO BIOGRAPHICAL CY-
CLOPEDIA AND PORTRAIT GALLERY 101 (1880). As an attorney, Swayne had even represented
several fugitive slaves. William Gillette, Noah II. Swayne, in 2 THE JUS'I10ES or 'ETIE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT I 789-1978: THEIR LIVES & MAJOR OPINIONS 990 (Leon Friedman it:
Fred L. Israel eds. 1980). His most famous representation came in the Oberlin rescue cases,
involving the Fugitive Slave Law. See genendly Bushnell v. Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); Bush-
nell v. Langston, 8 Ohio St. 599 (1858).
112
 Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. at 785-86.
Its Id. at 786-87.
1141d.
'" See id. at 792.
116 Id. at 794.
117
 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581,590-95 (1872).
118
 Id. at 581 (citing 1860 Ky. Acts, § 1, ch. 104, vol. 2, at 470). The law only permitted
blacks and Native Americans to act as 'competent witnesses" in civil suits to which the only
parties were blacks or Native Americans. Id.
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Kennard had murdered three generations of a black family.' 19 The
only witnesses to the crime were black. The United States Solicitor
General argued that the right to testify protected persons and prop-
erty, and was part and parcel of the freedom Congress assured all citi-
zens regardless of race.'" The Supreme Court, however, was convinced
by the defendants' procedural argument against federal court jurisdic-
tion and reversed the convictions.t 2 t The Court held that only living
persons could request removal, making conviction impossible. 122 No
one had standing to remove the case because the victims were dead
and the defendants had not affected any of the black witnesses.'"
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Joseph Bradley, criti-
cized both the majority's narrow reading of the Civil Rights Act and its
disregard for the liberal ideals surrounding the statute's passage. 124
Bradley concluded that. Congress broadly intended to prevent wanton,
racist conduct from being committed against the black community. 125
The Amendment attempted to "do away with the incidents and conse-
quences of slavery" and to replace them with civil liberty and equal-
ity.'" Justice Bradley further wrote that the chief aim of the Abolition
Amendment was to instate blacks to the full enjoyment of civil rights. 127
He also recognized that the majority opinion legitimized Kentucky's
practice of prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites and thereby
branded all blacks "with a badge of slavery."'"
Southern government officials and hoodlums alike used Blyew to
circumvent civil rights legislation. The case significantly diminished
the potential for a successful reconstruction. It branded blacks as easy
prey for individuals and groups who continued extolling the Confed-
eracy and sought to reinvigorate its institutions. If the Ku Klux Klan
(the "KKK") and other violent supremacist groups had been at all
leery of being tried in federal courts, Blyew relieved them of that
worry. The federal government could no longer provide a judicial fo-
119 Murder: Particulars of the Late Tinged) , in Lewis County, LOUISVILLE (Ky.) DAILY J.,
Sept. 9, 1868, at 3.
129
 Biyelti. 80 U.S. at 589.
121 Id. at 593-95.
122 see id .
1 " Id. at 581, 594.
124 Sec id. at 598-99 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
125 See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 595-96 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 601 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
127 See id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
129 Sec id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
2004)	 Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment
	 333
rum in cases where state laws prohibited blacks from testifying against
whites and the black victims of a crime were unavailable.
The period of substantive decline for Thirteenth Amendment.
jurisprudence began in 1883 with the Civil Rights Cases) 29 Bradley,
who was by then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, drafted the ma-
jority opinion. He qualified his earlier dissent in Blyew and
significantly contributed to the reversal of Radical Reconstruction.
His ruling has implications for the contemporary distinction between
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments."'"
The constitutionality of the first two sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 was the subject of litigation in the Civil Rights Cases."'
The Act was the last legislation passed by the Reconstruction Con-
gress. I 32 ByD) the time the case came before the Supreme Court, Recon-
struction had come to a grinding halt, even though many racialist in-
stitutions resembling slavery remained. These institutions included
adhesion contracts for sharecropping, segregation, peonage, and the
convict lease system."
129
 See generally 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1343 Parl V analyzes why this distinction makes the Thirteenth Amendment an impor-
tant component for innovative civil rights activism. See infra notes 310-321 and accompany-
ing text.
131
 The full name of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was An act to protect all citizens in
their civil and legal rights." 18 Stat. 335.
132 See Colbert, supra note 100, at 22 (discussing debate over Reconstruction that arose
in passing Civil Rights Act of 1875); see also WILLIAM B. HESSELT1NE, ULYSSES S. GRANT,
POLEIICIAN 368-71 (1935) (discussing President Ulysses Grant's role in the controversy);
jANIES M. MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO '111E
NAACP 16-19 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Charles Sumner's heroic effort to secure passage
of the Act). Even on his death bed, Sumner did not forget that abolition, via the Thir-
teenth Amendment, meant more than merely setting free millions of people who were
denied an education by Southern slave codes and were still excluded from numerous pub-
lic places. As he lay on his death bed, Sumner was not remiss to remind a visitor: "You must
take care of the civil-rights bill„ don't let it fail." ERIC FONER, A SnoRT HISTORY or
RECONSTRUCTION 226 (1990). Sunnier died in March 1874 and did not live to see the en-
actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. Benjamin Butler, who managed the Bill in the
1-louse, committed himself to defending "the rights of these men who have given their
blood for me and my country." Id.
133
 One author recently found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. as many as
one-third of all sharecropping farmers "were being held against their will in 1900." Sec
JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED 107 (1992). Other authors have focused specifically
on the convict lease system. See generally ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK or FREE
LABOR: Tut: POLITICAL EcoNomv or CONVICT LABOR IN '111E NEW SOU111 (1996); DAvin
M, °MINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERS' (1996); KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH REBELLION:
THE BATIIE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN 'DIE TENNESSEE COAL FIELDS, 1871-1896 (1998).
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The Civil Rights Cases involved five joint cases from various parts
of the country. 134
 The first four cases were reviews of criminal prose-
cutions."' Two of the defendants were charged for denying blacks
access to an inn or hotel, a third for prohibiting a black individual
from access to the dress circle of a theater in San Francisco, and a
fourth for refusing access to a New York opera house."' The fifth case
was a civil action from Tennessee against a railroad company whose
conductor prevented a black woman from riding in the ladies' car. 137
Attorneys for four of the five defendants did not even bother appear-
ing to argue the cases before the Court."' The favorable ruling the
defendants received was a clear signal for the national consensus to
draw away from abolitionist principles.
The limits on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers an-
nounced in the Civil Rights Cases continue to be binding, and the
Rehnquist Court recently further extended Chief Justice Bradley's
ruling."' The Civil Rights Cases held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects citizens against state interference with individual rights, but
not against individual invasion of individual rights."" Thus, Bradley
decided that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress
authority to prevent social discrimination, such as exclusion from
public places of amusement and segregation on public carriers. The
Court, therefore, found that the first two sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 were unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 14 I
Justice John Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in the Civil
Rights Cases, argued that congressional enforcement power, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was more realistic and analo-
gous to Radical Republican ideals of Reconstruction. The fifth section
of the Amendment, Justice Harlan wrote, enabled Congress to enact
134 109 U.S. at 4-5.
133 Id.
156 Id.
"7 Id.
1"
..3 LOREN MILLER. T/IE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME Coutur OF 'lam
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 137-38 (1966).
1" See infra text accompanying notes 313-316.
140 109 U.S. at 11,19 ("It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. In-
dividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a
deeper and broader scope. • . This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it
takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns,
public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation
on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.").
141 Id. at 24-25.
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"appropriate legislation ... and such legislation may be of a direct and
primary character, operating upon states, their officers and agents, and
also upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as exercise public
functions and wield power and authority under the state." 142
I critique the Fourteenth Amendment's state interference re-
quirement in relationship to the Thirteenth Amendment. in Part V. 143
Suffice it to say here that, in the unreconstructed South, the idea that.
states would regulate private discriminations was farfetched. Chief Jus-
tice Bradley made an artificial dichotomy, although one that was com-
mon in post-Reconstruction United States, between civil rights and so-
cial rights. In the Civil Rights Cases, he held that the Fourteenth
Amendment covered civil rights, which included making contracts and
leasing land, but not social rights, which pertained to using public ac-
commodations."4
 Thus, as Angela P. Harris pointed out in a recent ar-
ticle, the Court limited Congress's ability to protect citizens pursuant to
its federalist vision." 5
 The Court continues to follow the Civil Rights
Cases ruling on the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 148
 The ruling has so crippled the legislative branch's en-
forcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress was
forced to rely on the Commerce Clause to pass major civil rights legisla-
tion, like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in the twentieth century. 147
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases also considered whether the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was constitutional under the Thirteenth
Amendment, Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases provided the Supreme
Court with its first opportunity to directly interpret the Thirteenth
Amendment's substance. The Court recognized that the Amendment
went. further than simply releasing slaves from their masters' con-
trol. 148
 In fact, Chief Justice Bradley reiterated his conviction that the
142 1d. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145
 Sec infra notes 310-321 and accompanying text.
144 See James W. Fox, Jr., Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Im-
munities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 Ky. L.J. 67,160-61 (2002-2003) (explaining
the distinction made during the mid-nineteenth century between social, civil, mid political
rights).
145
 Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923,1961 (2000).
146 Sec Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels. and Unprincipled Neutrality
Claims, 44 Wm. & MARY L. lbw. 1285.1333-34 (2003) (stating that the current Court con-
dimes to follow the Civil Rights Cases holding on the restraints of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power).
147
 See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel.
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
146 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
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Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass all laws
"necessary and proper for the obliteration and prevention of slavery,
with all its badges and incidents."149 He even conceded that the Thir-
teenth Amendment prohibited state and private violations.'"
Nevertheless, the Court held that denying admission to public
accommodations was not a vestige of slavery. 151 The Court reasoned
that "the social rights of men and races in the community" differ from
"fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship. "152
Just as with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that
the Thirteenth Amendment only applies to civil and political rights.
The Civil Rights Cases limited the term "necessary incidents" of slavery
to a set of legal institutions, such as prohibitions against blacks testify-
ing in court and owning propertym Thus, the Court determined that
Congress overreached when it sought to extend legislative authority
against social discriminations. 154
Chief justice Bradley's conclusion was in no way obvious. He stuck
to an artificial dichotomy rather than recognizing that social discrimi-
nations perpetrated in public detrimentally affect both the victim and
his or her group. In these cases, social discriminations limited the
plaintiffs' ability to travel by rail, attend an opera, reserve a room at an
inn, or see a play with friends. Such infringements on the plaintiffs'
basic rights branded them unworthy of the same privilege to make per-
sonal choices enjoyed by whites and perpetuated the supremacist men-
tality of Southern slavocrac): The Court's holding showed callousness
to the way public accommodation discrimination hindered blacks from
enjoying their freedom. Chief Justice Bradley's dismissive opinion in
149 Id. at 20-21.
159 See id. at 20.
151 Id. at 25.
155 Sec id. at 22. Bradley went on to say that the Thirteenth Amendment "simply abol-
ished slavery" whereas the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibited the states from abridging
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." See id. at 23. His conclusions
deviate from his dissent to Blyew, in which he recognized Congress's power to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 indicate that congressmen
regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a conduit for equal rights legislation. See supra
notes 124-128 and accompanying text; see also George A. Schell, Note, Open Hotising•Jones
Y. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ea' Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. RtIv. 553, 556
(1969) (discussing the Court's differentiation between social and civil rights).
153 See 109 U.S. at 22.
154 Sec id. at 24-25. Bradley put this point in the form of a perinea° ad absurdum: It
would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as
to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business." Id.
2004]	 Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment
	 337
the Civil Rights Cases furthered the social tensions and misery that the
Radical Republicans hoped to eliminate with the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Homegrown militias, such as the KKK, and private business
owners who refused to provide blacks with goods and services were
now protected by state indifference or outright support for discrimi-
natory prfictices. 155
justice Harlan, in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, understood
that the majority's decision precluded the national government from
ending state-sponsored or -countenanced abridgements of free-
cionts, 156
 He found the majority's opinion to be "narrow and artificial"
and inimical to the "substance and spirit" of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. 157
 Harlan understood that because the dogma of black inferior-
ity was integral to maintaining slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment's
guarantee of "freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and pro-
tection against, all discrimination against them, because of their race,
in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races." 158
For Justice Harlan, this principle carried a practical implication:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to
protect that people against the deprivation, on account of their
race, of any civil rights enjoyed by other freemen in the same
state; and such legislation may be of a direct and primary
character, operating upon states, their officers and agents,
and also upon, at least, such individuals and corporations as
exercise public functions and wield power and authority un-
der the state. 159
Although justice Harlan agreed with Chief Justice Bradley that
Congress lacked the power to regulate social interaction, he pro-
claimed that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in fact did protect civil
155 See id. Bradley explicitly argued that equal access to public amenities is uncon-
nected to the enjoyment of fundamental rights: "There were thousands of free colored
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of
life, liberty, and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that
it was any invasion of their personal status as freemen because he was not admitted to all
the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations
in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of amuse-
ment." Id. at 25.
165 Sec id. at 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
07 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
15t? Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rights. 00
 He argued that state laws and private practices denying blacks
the use of public accommodations excluded them from participation in
an essential aspect of civic life.m
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Thirteenth Amendment was rele-
gated to virtual disuse. The Court continued to chip away at federal-
ism and Congress's ability to prevent private or state discrimination.
The Court maintained the distinction between social and civil rights
in Plessy v. Ferguson, where the Court did not regard the facilitation of
social equality to be part of judicial function. 162 In concluding that
separate accommodations on railcars did not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Court quoted the Civil Rights Cases for the proposi-
tion that the end of slavery did not require anyone to deal with other
races in matters of intercourse or business. 165 Justice Henry Brown,
writing for the Plessy majority, took a literalist approach to slavery, at-
tacking the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamped African Americans with a badge of inferiority. 164
Just as he had in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan wrote the
dissenting opinion in Plessy. He regarded the right of persons to share
railroad cars as inherent in the concept of freedom. 165 Harlan was
prescient in foreseeing that the separate but equal doctrine would not
be limited to rail travel, but would continue to infect many other as-
pects of civil society. 166
16° Id. at 59 (Harlan, j„ dissenting).
161 See id. at 55-56 (Harland, dissenting).
162 See 163 U.S. 537.551-52 (1896) (stating that "[i]l' the two races are to meet upon
terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of
each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.... If the civil and political
rights of both laces be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one
race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane").
163 Id. at 543 ("`lt would be running the slavery argument into the ground,' said Mr.
Justice Bradley, 'to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will ... deal with in other
matters of intercourse or business,'" (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)).
1 " Id. at 551. Only in 1954 did the Supreme Court find the "separate but equal" doc-
trine unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Ethic., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954).
165 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the importance of Harlan's dis-
sent in Messy to principled legal discourse, see BRuct: Acta:it/slimy, I WE THE PEOPLE: Fumy-
nATioNs 146 (1991) and T. Alexander Aleinikoff. A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 Comm.
L. REV. 1060.1076 (1991).
166 justice Harlan reflected on the extensive implications of the majority's holding: "If
a state can prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as
passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of
its cities and towns as to compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street, and black
citizens to keep on the other?" Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, j„ dissenting).
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The escape from the morass into which the Court had helped
drag this country came in 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 167 That
case overruled the Civil Rights Cases limited construction of the Thir-
teenth Amendment's second section." The Jones Court ruled that
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a "necessary and
proper" means of prohibiting private and public discrimination in
real estate transactions." However, Justice Potter Stewart, writing for
the Court, expressly avoided reaching the issue of whether the Thir-
teentit Amendment granted Congress authority to prevent discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation, concluding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had made that issue moot.'" Nevertheless, Jones
gave Congress wide latitude to pass legislation against civil rights viola-
tions. The majority wrote that "[s] urely Congress has the power under
the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation." 171
A logical extension of Jones is that Congress has the power to leg-
islate against state or private infringements that arbitrarily interfere
with individuals' right to live freely. Although Congress's determina-
tion of arbitrariness is subject to a rationality requirement, the stan-
dard is a low one that the federal legislature can meet by examining
167
 392 U.S. 409,438-44 (1968) (upholding Congress's power to prevent private hous-
ing discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
168 Id.
' 69 Id. (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20). The Enabling Clause "clothed 'Con-
gress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States." Id. The Court read § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (2002)) to prohibit private actors from discriminating against real property pur-
chasers: "Ill he fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals.
whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If Congress has
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes
from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute
calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of
Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private
individuals." Id. at 438-39. For a survey of civil rights cases arising tinder nineteenth cen-
tury statutes, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 see Note, Federal
Power to Regulate Primte Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruc-
tion Era Amendments, 74 Courta. L. REr. 449, 466-505 (1974).
170
 Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41,441 n.78 ("Etilie Court did conclude in the Civil Rights
Cases that 'the act of ... the owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place of amuse-
ment, refusing ... accommodation' cannot be 'justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant' .... hvJhatever the present validity of the position
taken by the majority on that issue—a question rendered largely academic by Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24)).
' 71 Id. at 440,
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the historical landmarks of slavery, evaluating what existing practices
perpetuate the incidents of involuntary servitude, and promulgating
laws to end them. Congress, then, has the power to end any existing
coercive and arbitrary injustices analogous to involuntary servitude.
Jones also recognized that the United States is responsible for pro-
tecting its citizens against arbitrary infringement of fundamental
rights. 172 National civil rights laws, therefore, can confront civil rights
violations directly and need not operate behind a veil of congressional
power over interstate commerce. 173 Moreover, Jones required courts to
analyze human rights violations in a way significantly different from the
state action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the de-
cision raised intriguing questions about whether, even without congres-
sional action, persons can bring suit both against states and individuals
for violating the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment. 174 This is
because, whereas the second section authorizes Congress to pass fed-
eral laws rationally tailored to end the badges and incidents of servi-
tude, the first section is a self-executing, judicially enforceable prohibi-
tion against any remaining incidents of involuntary servitude, and that
institution's injustices far exceeded forced labor.
In the Supreme Court cases that followed Jones, the Court con-
tinued holding that Congress could prohibit private racial discrimina-
tion pursuant to its Section 2 Thirteenth Amendment power. In Run-
yon u McCrary the Court addressed the narrow issue of whether
§ 1981 prohibited private schools from refusing to enroll students
based on their race.'" Its holding had broad social ramifications on
the integration of private schools. The relevant part of the statute
provided that, "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State ... to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." justice Stewart based
172 Id. at 440-11.
1"3 See infra text accompanying notes 274-281.
174 See Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 ("'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth
Amendment 'abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.'" (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20)). In a later case, the Court noted the outstanding issue lof "whether
§ 1 of the Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery." City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1981). This means that the Court neither
agreed nor disagreed with the first Justice Harlan's statement in dissent in Hodges that 'by
its own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery and all its incidents and badges, and
established freedom.'" Id. at 126 n.40 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hodges v. United
States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 (1906), overruled byfones, 392 U.S. 409).
175 427 U.S. 160, 163 (1976).
175 Id. at 160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)).
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his decision on § 1981's prohibition against contract discrimination.'"
The school violated the law because it refused to enter into a contract
with the parents of potential students who happened to be black. 118
The Court found that the free association and privacy rights of par-
ents wanting to keep the school segregated did not trump the rights
of parents wanting to enroll their children.'" Parental desire to send
their children to a private, segregated school also did not override the
government's reasonable prohibition against the school's discrimina-
tory contracting practices. 18°
The Court could have sent an even stronger message about the
nation's commitment to freedom had it used a more historical, rather
than contractual, analysis. The Court's holding could have been based
on the right to parental autonomy, which had been denied both
through Slave Codes and by individual slave masters.um Schools that
refuse to admit students because of their race violate the parents'
1 " Id. at 168-73.
"8 Id. at 172-73 ("It is apparent that the racial exclusion practiced by the Fairfax-
Brewster School and Bobbe's Private School amounts to a classic violation of § 1981. The
parents • • . sought to enter into contractual relationships ... for educational services....
Under those contractual relationships, the schools would have received payments for ser-
vices rendered, and the prospective students would have received instruction in return for
those payments. But neither school offered services on equal basis to white and non-
white students."). Justice Byron White, writing for the dissent, argued that § 1981 could
not be used to force people to enter into contracts, no matter what their motives were for
refusing to do so. Id. at 194-95 (White, J., dissenting).
"9 M. at 175-77.
181} Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-77.
181 Mary Beth Norton et al., The Afiro-.1ntesican Family in the. Age of Revolution, in SLAVERY
ANt) FREEDOM IN TIIE AGE OF AMERICAN REVOLUTION 186-87 (Ira Berlin & Ronald
Hoffman eds., 1983) (explaining that slavery compromised family integrity because mas-
ters could sell their slaves for economic, subduing, or whimsical reasons); see HERBERT C.
OUTMAN, BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY & FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 207-11 (1976) (conclud-
ing that despite the risk of being forcefully separated by sale, slaves were able to develop
cohesive family structures); Peter Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A
Comparative Peapective, 71 J. Am. His.r. 579,584 (1983) (discussing the difficulties faced by
slaves who married the slaves of other owners). For more regional information about the
slave family that developed since the 1980s, see generally LARRY E. HUDSON, JR., To HAVE
AND HOLD: SLAVE WORK & FAMILY LIFE IN AWITRELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1997); ANN
PATTON MALONE, SWEET CHARIOT: SLAVE FAMILY ANt) HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA (1992). After 1865, in an effort to retain slavery through
legal ruse, several states instituted child apprenticeship laws. These statutes required chil-
dren to serve for a term of indenture away from parents, so long as a white judge deter-
mined that such service was in the children's best interests. PETER KOLCIIIN, AMERICAN
SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 220-21 (1993). These child apprenticeships, as Leon Litwack
pointed out, amounted to legalized kidnapping and de facto slavery. LEON F. LITWACK.
BEEN IN .111E: STORM SO LONG: THE ArrutmATIF OF SLAVERY 191,237-38 (1979).
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Thirteenth Amendment right to make rational decisions about where
to educate their children, not merely the parents' contractual right.
The Court's 1973 decision in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n provided even stronger ammunition in the civil rights arsenal. 182
The litigation involved a private swimming club that discriminated
against blacks in its membership and guest policies. 183 Three African
Americans, to whom the Association denied access, sought damages
and an injunction against the practice pursuant to the racist leasing
and rental practice prohibitions under §§ 1981 and 1982. 184 Justice
Harry Blackmun, for the majority, reasoned that because the Associa-
tion's membership was tied to a narrow geographic location, persons
who lived and purchased property valuated their real estate partly on
the expectation that they could join the recreation center. 185 The deci-
sion was thus again rooted in contract law rather than in a fundamen-
tal right to enjoy public accommodations. The Court limited itself to
examining the discrimination on the basis of the existing statutes in-
stead of the Thirteenth Amendment's underlying principles.
In a 1975 case, Johnson V. Railway Express Agency, Inc., the Court
further extended the applicability of § 1981, finding that it allowed
recovery for the discriminatory conduct of a private employer. 186 The
case provides a rich distinction between employment discrimination
claims under § 1981 and Title VII, the latter being the traditional ave-
nue for relief in employment discrimination cases. 187 The Court's
holding makes clear why plaintiffs often fair better in employment
discrimination claims filed under § 1981 instead of Title VII. For in-
stance, Title VIT's relatively short statute of limitations is not applica-
ble to § 1981 claims. 188 Instead, § 1981 claims, a la Johnson, apply the
pertinent personal injury statute of limitations from the plaintiff's state.
182 SCC 410 U.S. 431,435-40 (1973).
188 Id. at 432-33.
184 Id. at 433-34. The Court found no need to examine whether §§ 1981 and 1982 ap-
plied to private discrimination, determining that it was sufficient that the "operative lan-
guage" of both was "traceable" to section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 439-10.
185 Id. at 437.
188 421 U.S. 454,459-61 (1975).
187 Sec id. at 457-67.
188
 Title Vii ordinarily requires an aggrieved party to file a charge with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commissionission ("EEOC") within 180 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice, or 300 days after the unlawful practice if the aggrieved party files a
discrimination complaint in a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2003). Filing a
Title NTH action with the EEOC does not toll the statute of limitations on § 1981 claims,
Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465-66.
2004]	 Civil Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment
	 343
In Johnson, the Court applied Tennessee's one-year limitation period, 189
which was significantly longer than Title VII's 180-day requirement to
file the employment claim with the EEOC or 300 days to file with a state
office. Other courts commonly apply two- or three-year state personal
injury statutes of limitations to § 1981 cases. 19° Further advantages to
the Thirteenth Amendment-based employment discrimination claims
are that § 1981 does not exempt employers who are improper parties
under Title VII and § 1981 does not require the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies. 01 Johnson. offers a meaningful alternative to persons
seeking creative litigation strategies to obtain equitable and pecuniary
relief for employment discrimination . 192
In a 1989 case, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court
ruled that § 1981 applies to racial discrimination perpetrated during
the contract formation process, but. not to post-formation discrimina-
tion. 193
 Congress superceded the Court's ruling by passing the Civil
Rights Act. of 1991, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981(14. 194
 The section pro-
vides that. "the term `make and enforce contracts' includes the making,
1119 421  U.S. at 462.
195 See, e.g., Rogers v. Barkin, No. 00-16025, 2001 WI, 1218413, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31,
2001) (deciding that Nevada's two-year personal injury statute of limitations applied to
§ 1981 claims); Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying
a two-year personal injury statute of limitations to both § 1981 and § 1983 claims); Thomas
v. Denny's, Inc„ 111 F.3d 1506, 1514 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that damages awarded
for a § 1981 claim were limited by the state's two-year personal injury statute). Some courts
have also applied three-year personal injury statutes of limitations. See, e.g.. King v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 2002); Carney v. Am. Univ., 151 E3c1 1090. 1096
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit even found that a four-rear statute of limitations
applied to a § 1981 claim. Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 1480, 1481 (11th
Cir. 1988).
191 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460-61 (asserting that "[s] ection 1981 is not coextensive in its
coverage with Title VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(b)"). The Supreme Court stated this flatter more positively in a footnote to a
1994 case. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) ("Even in the
employment context, § 1981's coverage is broader than Title VIPs, for Title VII applies
only to employers with 15 or more employees, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), whereas § 1981
has no such limitation."). Likewise, in a concurring and dissenting opinion to Pommy, 14
McLean Credit Union, Justice William Brennan wrote that "§ 1981 is not limited in scope to
employment discrimination by businesses with 15 or more employees, cf. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), and hence may reach the nearly 15% of the workforce not covered by Title
VII." 491 U.S. 164, 211 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But
then, Title VII also has advantages; it provides certain remedies, such as the recovery of at-
torneys' fees, which § 1981 does not.folinson, 421 U.S. at 460.
192
 Plaintiffs may sue to recover damages tinder both Title VII and § 1981. Johnson, 421
U.S. at 459.
1" 491 U.S. at 171.
194
 Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2003)).
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performance, modification and termination of contracts, and the en-
joyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contrac-
tual relationship:495 Furthermore, the amended version of § 1981 ex-
plicitly covers private and state violators. 198
The cases decided since the 1968 landmark decision in Jones show
just how broadly the Thirteenth Amendment reaches, even when liti-
gants rely on civil rights statutes like §§ 1981 and 1982. 197 Congress
can go much farther and pass new statutes pursuant to its Section 2
authority, particularly in light of the sensibility against discrimination
that has burgeoned in the United States since the 1960s. Certainly
discrimination in real estate transactions and private schools is not
literally slavery or involuntary servitude. The Court, however, inter-
preted the Thirteenth Amendment as granting Congress discretion-
ary power to determine what forms of discrimination are rationally
related to the incidents and badges of servitude. The Court's analyses
in Jones, Runyon, and Johnson indicate that Congress can pass effective
laws rationally designed to end any remaining incidents and badges of
servitude. I return to the subject of how to differentiate which liber-
ties the Thirteenth Amendment covers below, where I show how the
Amendment fits into traditional civil rights law. 198
B. Section One Authority
The Supreme Court has never determined whether a private
party can bring a cause of action under the first section of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The Court's current stance on this issue is some-
what ambiguous. Generally, lower court decisions proscribe inde-
pendent judicial use of Section 1 to determine which discriminations
are rationally related to the incidents and badges of servitude. 199
195 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2003).
196 Id. ("The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by non-
governmental discrimination and impairment tinder color of State law.").
197 Both statutes are modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
198 Sec infra Part V.B.
199 Other courts have required plaintiffs to confine themselves to statutes passed pur-
suant to Congress's Section 2 power, See, e.g.. Crenshaw v. City of Defuniak Springs, 891 F.
Stipp. 1548, 1556-57 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (noting, however, that "neither the Supreme Court
of the United States or the Courts of Appeal have decided the extent to which a direct
cause of action exists under the Thirteenth Amendment"). On this point, the Fifth Circuit
noted in 1997 that, "[w]hile it is true that suits attacking the 'badges and incidents of slav-
ery' must be based on a statute enacted under § 2, suits attacking compulsory labor arise
directly under prohibition of § 1, which is 'undoubtedly self-executing without any ancil-
lary legislation.'" Charmer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 217 n.5 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit slated that "kJ bile Congress may
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There is, however, a faint glimmer of hope in Supreme Court dicta
that suggests a more progressive position.
Palmer v. Thompson., decided in 1971, addressed the Section 1 is-
sue but left it turresolved.M In 1962, Jackson, Mississippi closed four
segregated swimming pools and surrendered the lease of a fifth seg-
regated pool."' Whites had exclusively used four pools and only
blacks used the fifth. 202
 The city council claimed that its decision was
based on findings that continuing to operate the pools would be too
costly and that closing them was necessary for preserving public or-
der. 203
 The petitioners sought an injunction to reopen the pools on a
desegregated basis. They claimed that Jackson closed the facilities "be-
cause of ideological opposition to racial integration in swimming pools"
and that the city thereby violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendmen ts."4
 Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, refused to
second-guess the legislators' motives. 205
 The Court determined that the
arguably have some discretion in determining what kind of protective legislation to enact
pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, it appears that the amendment's independent
scope is limited to the eradication of the incidents or badges of slavery and does not reach
other acts of discrimination." Washington v. Finlay. 664 F.2d 913. 927 (4th Cir. 1981).
The general trend among lower courts has been to reject an independent cause of ac-
tion under the Thirteenth Amendment. This is particularly true with employment discrimi-
nation claims. See, e.g., Rash v. Minority Intermodal Specialists, Inc„ 2001 WL 1654710, at *5
(N.D. III. Dec. 20, 2001) (stating that "IpJlaintiff cannot bring a private right of action di-
rectly under the Thirteenth Amendment for employment discrimination"); Horton v. Nor-
folk S. Corp., 102 F. Stipp. 2d 330, 335 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (stating the Thirteenth Amendment
does not provide "an independent action for employment discrimination"); Mitchell V. Car-
rier Corp., 954 F. Stipp. 1568, 1575 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment does not provide an independent cause of action in employment cases); Baker v.
McDonald's Corp., 686 F. Stipp. 1474, 1480 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating that. although un-
equal treatment of black persons may violate the Thirteenth Amendment, "plaintiff may not
maintain a cause of action directly under the Thirteenth Amendment for employment dis-
crimination. Rather, the plaintiff must base his claims on one of the implementing statutes,
e.g.. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) or § 1981").
These outcomes are not the Thirteenth Amendment's necessary effect. Section 1 of
the Amendment could allow courts to be just as expansive in determining that a particular
discrimination is rationally related to the incidents and badges of servitude as Congress's
broad power to do so tinder Section 2. For a discussion of why lower court decisions limit-
ing the use of Section 1 diverge from Supreme Court precedents, see Larry J. Pittman,
Physician Assisted Suicide in the Do* Ward: The Intersection of the Thirteenth Amendment and
Health Care Treatments Having Disproportionate Impacts on Disfavored Groups. 28 S•rox W ALL.
L. REV. 774, 851-71 (1998).
200 See generally 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
2" Id. at 218-19.
202 Id,
2°3 Id. a t 225.
2" Id. at 224-25.
265 Palmer. 403 U.S. at 224-25.
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stated legislative purposes were beyond the scope of judicial review and
affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief. 2°6
The petitioners had argued that "the city's closing of the pools to
keep the two races from swimming together violates the Thirteenth
Amendment."207
 Justice Black determined that, absent a federal law re-
quiring the Court to open swimming pools, the Court could not "legis-
late new laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout the
length and breadth of this Nation." 208 The Court implicitly recognized
Congress's second section authority to pass a law prohibiting govern-
mental entities from purposefully refusing to desegregate. 209 The Court,
however, refused to use any "authority under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to declare new laws to govern the thousands of towns and cities of
the country" because that "would grant it a law-making power far beyond
the imagination of the amendmenes_authors.'"21 ° Instead, the Court de-
clared that, "[Otte last sentence of the Amendment reads: 'Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.' But
Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate a city's open-
ing or closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities. "211
Even though the Court decided not to require that the city reopen
the pools, the dictum in Palmer was the closest the Court has come to
recognizing that it might sua sponte use Section 1 authority to find a
discriminatory law unconstitutional. The Court stated that Is] hould
citizens of Jackson or any other city be able to establish in court that
public, tax-supported swimming pools are being denied to one group
200 Id. at 225-27. After accepting the lower court's finding that the city council closed
the pools for legitimate safety and economic reasons, the Court explained why it refused to
second-guess the proffered motives:
[1] here is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law be-
cause of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law is struck down for this
reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably
be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.
Id. at 225. The Court has repeatedly refused to strike down constitutional legislative ac-
tions for alleged illicit motives. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. 277,292 (2000) (stat-
ing that the Court would uphold a statute based on an allegedly "illicit motive" if otherwise
constitutional); United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367,383 (1968) (It is a familiar princi-
ple of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.").
207 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226-27.
208
	 at 227.
209 See id.
210 Id. at 226-27.
211 Id. at 227,
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because of color and supplied to another, they will be entitled to re-
lief."212
 This statement leaves open the possibility that litigants can ob-
tain an injunction, absent statutory authority, if they petition to deseg-
regate an open public facility rather than praying to reopen closed
ones. The dictum is particularly intriguing because it comes at the very
end of the opinion, almost inviting a citizen lawsuit to rely on Section 1
to petition for an injunction. The likelihood that the Court would issue
such an injunction, however, is small given the absence of any decisive
precedent on the matter. 213
One of Palmet's greatest weaknesses lies in the Court's failure to
analyze the extent to which the category "badges and incidents of ser-
vitude" extends to social discrimination, such as swimming pool seg-
regation. NOwhere in the decision did the Court analyze whether ra-
cism and its coercive practices developed through forced, public
racial segregation. If the Court concluded that segregation in public
places stamped blacks with a badge of inferiority that limited auton-
omy rights and helped maintain a divisive society, granting an injunc-
tion would not have amounted to making new law. Instead, the Court
would have acknowledged that slavery extends beyond the plantation
system and continues to plague the United States. Such a finding also
would not have required the Court to micromanage "thousands of
towns and cities."2" Instead, it would have granted victims standing to
file claims pursuant to Section 1. Litigation, then, would have focused
on ripe issues.
The Court's decided avoidance of a timely issue was question-
begging. The Court in Palmer could have relied on Justice Harlan's
dissent in Hodges, where he asserted that Section 1 did much more
than free slaves: "by its own force, that Amendment destroyed slavery
and all its incidents and badges, and established freedom." 215
Ten years after Palmer; the Court again considered whether the
first. section of the Thirteenth Amendment went any farther than sim-
ply abolishing slavery. 21° In City of Memphis v. Greene, black citizens ob-
212 Palmer, 903 U.S. at 227.
213
 Larry Pittman, however, has argued extensively that in Palmer the Supreme Court
recognized that claims can be brought directly pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Sec Pittman, supra note 199, at 860 (stating that Palmer and Greene indicate the Supreme
Court removed "uncertainty regarding one's ability to bring a direct claim under the Thir-
teenth Amendment").
214 Palmer, 403 U.S. at 227.
21 ' Hodges, 203 U.S. at 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (dissenting from an opinion that
found the Thirteenth Amendment only abolished slavery in the literal sense).
216 Greene, 451 U.S. at 102, 124.
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jected to the closing of a street running between a predominantly black
area and a white residential community. The plaintiffs claimed that the
closing constituted a badge of servitude because it affected black citi-
zens' ability to enjoy their property.217
 The Court held that the City's
motives were to protect children's safety and preserve residential quie-
tude, not to discriminate. 218 The street closing constituted a "routine
burden of citizenship" and was not, therefore, a badge of servitude. 219
The Court in Greene did, however, emphasize the Thirteenth
Amendment's self-executing first section. 220 The decision further indi-
cated that, under the right circumstances, the Court might allow a
claim directly under Section 1, even absent congressional action. 221
Memphis had based its argument on Pahner; claiming that absent direct
congressional enabling legislation the Court could not hold for the
plaintiffs. 222 The Court rejected Memphis's argument and stated that
"[plursuant to the authority created by § 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Congress has enacted legislation to abolish both the conditions
of involuntary servitude and the 'badges and incidents of slavery.'" 223
This "exercise of that authority" the Court went on "is not inconsistent
with the view that the Amendment has self-executing force. "224
Interestingly, the majority emphasized the possibility that courts
have the power to find that Section 1 extends beyond the abolition of
slavery:
In Jones, the Court left open the question whether § 1 of the
Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abol-
ish slavery. It is also appropriate today to leave that question
open because a review of the justification for the official ac-
tion challenged in this case demonstrates that its disparate
impact on black citizens could not, in any event, be fairly
characterized as a badge or incident of slavery. 225
Presumably, if the Court did decide that Section 1 extended beyond
mere abolition, it could enable the judiciary to use a methodological
analysis of discriminatory actions similar to the one Jones established
217
 Id.
216 Id. at 126-28.
219 Id. at 129.
2" See id. at 124-29.
221 Greene, 451 U.S. at 124-29.
2t2 Id. at 124.
223 Id. at 124-25.
224
 Id.
225 hi. at 125.
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for the legislature. 226 This dictum in Greene indicates that, given a jus-
ticiable controversy, the judiciary could decide whether a cause of ac-
tion amounts to a badge or incident of servitude.
The Supreme Court has not subsequently returned to clarify this
important point. This leaves open the question of whether a private
claim is available tinder Section 1 absent an ancillary statute and, if
such a cause of action is available, whether it may be filed against pub-
lic and private actors.
C. Summing up
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence has emerged from the
narrow Court holding in the Civil Rights Cases. This case precluded
petitioners from seeking to end discriminatory practices in public ac-
commodations. Had the Court come to the opposite conclusion, a
civil rights movement could have bourgeoned immediately after the
Civil War, and the Thirteenth Amendment could have helped end
many stigmatizing practices, such as racial segregation, which contin-
ued into the 1960s, By the 1896 Plessy decision, the Supreme Court
virtually nullified the Amendment's effectiveness, having become
complicit. in legitimizing separate but equal practices. Filially, with the
1906 Hodges decision, the Supreme Court undermined Congress's
ability to prevent the perpetuation of any badges and incidents of ser-
vitude, except those directly associated with peonage and chattel slav-
ery. Only in 1968, with the ruling in Jones, did the Court recognize its
earlier mistake. Jones returned the Thirteenth Amendment to its bas-
tion among other cornerstones of federal civil rights.
Even today, the Thirteenth Amendment remains a sparsely used
and little-defined part of the Constitution. The Amendment. has re-
cently become ever more relevant because the Supreme Court has
narrowly construed legislative power under the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 227 Supreme Court deci-
226 See 392 U.S. at 440 ("Surely Congress has the power under the "fhirteenth Amend-
ment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.").
227
 William N. Eskridge, Jr.. Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century. 100 Mien. L. Rev. 2062, 2322-23 (2002) (arguing that recent
cases are ahistorical in their approaches and that 'DJ t is now unclear how much authority
Congress has to implement the politics of remediation for women. lesbigay people, the
disabled"); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law. 90 CAL. L. Rix.
1541, 1577 (2002) (commenting that "the Court intended, by placing such stringent re-
quirements on the effects test in [United States trd Lopez and Morrison. to police the limits of
Congress's Commerce Clause authority, regardless of whether Congress itself finds that the
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sions, such as Kitnel v. Florida Board of Regents, United Stales v. Morrison,
and City of Boerne v. Flores, have restricted Congress's ability to enact
antidiscrimination laws. 228 At the same time, the Supreme Court has
not similarly limited _Jones and the subsequent cases addressing Con-
gress's Thirteenth Amendment power. Federalism developments in
the areas of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment common
law demand a creative approach, which can be found in a new com-
mitment to Thirteenth Amendment civil rights activism.
N. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The next issue to analyze is whether the Thirteenth Amendment
alternative can bolster civil rights cases that have traditionally relied
on the Commerce Clause for their authority. This analysis requires a
preliminary explanation of the case law regarding the regulation of
interstate commerce and then a critical comparison to Thirteenth
Amendment authority and its potentials. The Thirteenth Amendment
is not susceptible to the economic interpretation that the Court has
recently given the Commerce Clause.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence developed during the New Deal
and established the federal government's authority to regulate activities
integral to the national economy. 229 The U.S. Supreme Court even ex-
tended the national government's power over interstate commerce to
the regulation of private farms growing crops for the farmer's consump-
tion.2" The New Deal Court learned from Lochner v. New yolk what
activity affects commerce or places the 'affecting commerce' language in a statute and
leaves that finding to a jury"); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HAM'. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (2001) (asserting that the Court's recent cases indi-
cate a willingness to cast aside long-established precedent, "especially those limiting Con-
gress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But see Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Cm. L. REV. 101, 103-04. 146 (2001)
(writing in favor of an economic, restricted application of the Commerce Clause); Diane
McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing
the furisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1682-85. 1730-37 (2002) (explain-
ing that Lopez and Morrison constrict Congress's power to regulate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce and proposing a further limitation of Commerce Clause
powers, using a nexus test).
2214 Sec infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
229 James G. Pope recently wrote a fascinating article on the labor movement's decision
to base labor rights activism on the Commerce Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment.
See generally James G. Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment limits the Contmetve Clause: Labor and the
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 CoLum. L. REV. 1 (2002). Pope's elm
phasis on labor's constitutional freedoms is beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 15.
230 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111. 118-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1938 because family farm consumption had a cumulative effect on the
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seemed, for many years, to be a sustained lesson not to meddle in ra-
tional federal laws regulating interstate commerce. 231
 The Court's def-
erence on matters of commerce carried over into the civil rights arena.
By the 1960s, constitutional lawyers regularly resorted to the
Commerce Clause in litigation. Part of their aim was to adopt strate-
gies to circumvent the eighty-year-old state action restrictions in United
States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.232
 Civil rights leaders, too,
recognized that private acts of discrimination violated the individual
right of self-determination and wanted the federal government to
provide a remedy against private actors. 233
To that end, Congress passed numerous 1960s civil rights statutes
relying, in large part, on its Commerce Clause authority. The success
of presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in spurring a
civil rights agenda culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 234 That
statute continues today to provide remedies against a variety of dis-
criminations, including those perpetrated in public accommodations,
employment, and housing. The Supreme Court, under the leadership
of Chief Justice Earl Warren, used the Commerce Clause instead of
post-Reconstruction jurisprudence on Congress's Fourteenth Amend-
ment powers to justify Congress's enactment of laws against private
discrimination. 235
national wheat market), United States n Lopez did not overrule Wickard, but called it "the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity." 514 U.S.
549, 560 (1995).
251
 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) ("Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Con-
gress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.").
232
 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that Congress's Four-
teenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement powers are limited to state action); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (invalidating the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 13, which punished private conspiracies).
255
 Even though many, including the Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy. and consti-
tutional scholars, like Gerald Gunther, counseled to use the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, understood that without overruling the Civil Rights Cases
such a suggestion was a nonstarter. Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role
of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1312 (2000). Because stare decisis indicated that
the likelihood of overruling the 1883 decision was small, Cox convinced the President to
follow the Commerce Clause strategy. See id. at 1310-13.
254
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
255
 See Jim Chen, Come Bath to the Nielde and Five: Tracing the Warren Court's Pursuit of
Equal Justice Under the Law, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1203, 1231-32 (2002); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(b) (2003) (prohibiting public place discrimination and segregation "affecting
352	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 45:307
In a 1964 watershed case, Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United
States, the Supreme Court determined that Congress could use its
power to regulate interstate commerce to prevent a private motel
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin. The Motel refused to rent rooms to African Americans while
advertising nationally and serving clientele from interstate high-
ways. 236 The Court held that the Motel's refusals caused blacks to be
"subject of discrimination in transient accommodations," forcing
them to travel greater distances to find another motel or stay with
friends. 237 Oddly, it was the Motel that raised the Thirteenth Amend-
ment claim, arguing that requiring it to provide accommodations to
unwanted customers would subject the business to involuntary servi-
tude. 238 The Court rejected the Motel's reasoning and held that the
Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress authority to pass rationally
designed antidiscrimination laws for bettering the general welfare.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to reverse the Civil Rights Cases Four-
teenth Amendment bar against federal laws prohibiting public ac-
commodation discrimination.239
That same year, the Court decided, in Katzenbach v. McClung, that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutionally prohibits a family-owned
restaurant from discriminating against potential patrons. 24° In the dis-
trict court, the plaintiffs relied on a Thirteenth Amendment argu-
ment. The trial court found the Amendment irrelevant to the issue
because it neither permitted nor denied Congress power to pass laws
against discrimination. 24 ' The trial court also found there was no
"close and substantial relation" between the restaurant and interstate
commerce. 242 The Supreme Court did not follow the "close and sub-
stantial relation" test. Instead, it determined that Congress had a "ra-
tional basis" for adopting the Act's regulatory scheme based on evi-
dence that segregated restaurants hindered business, inhibited travel,
interstate commerce or supported in their activities by State action as places of public ac-
commodation"). The Court noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc. v. United States that the
history of the Act indicates that Congress based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to regulate interstate commerce
under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution.* 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964).
256 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
237 Id. at 252-53.
258 Id. at 244.
239 Id. at 278; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
240 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964).
241 Id. at 297.
242 Id.
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and therefore detrimentally affected interstate commerce. 243
 The
Court refused, however, to reach the Thirteenth Amendment issue.
For decades, Heart. of Atlanta Motel and McClung stood for the
deferential principle that Congress could pass any necessary laws ra-
tionally connected to interstate commerce. The Court did not second-
guess congressional factfinding when it met this minimum thresh-
old. 244
 So long as the legislature did not pass a law based on arbitrary
and concocted findings, the Court time and again found statutes con-
stitutional. Prior to 1997, as Harold J. [(rent. pointed out, the Court
also did not categorically require that all legislation with constitu-
tional implications be supported by legislative findings. 245 Such a re-
quirement. "unquestionably would fundamentally alter the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the legislature. "246
Although use of Commerce Clause authority was a well-
established civil rights strategy by the 1990s, recent Court decisions
put the continued viability of this strategy into doubt. For example,
the Rehnquist majority reduced Congress's effectiveness in enacting
legislation pursuant to its Commerce Clause power in United States v.
Morrison, where the Court struck clown a national law prohibiting
gender-motivated violence, and United States v. Lopez, where it found
unconstitutional a federal statute against the possession of firearms
near a school. 247
 In the name of federalism, the Court's rulings both
diminished Congress's power to act on rational findings that some-
thing affects interstate commerce and increased judicial oversight
authori ty248 These decisions make the Thirteenth Amendment ever
more relevant.
241 1d. at 303-05.
244
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This
Court has not previously held that Congress must document the existence of a problem in
every State prior to proposing a national solution.").
245
 Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Praptiety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1996), For an earlier rendition of the same
point, see Archibald Cox, Farmyard: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rtv. 91, 105 (1966) ("The Court does not review the stifficiency of the
evidence in the record to support congressional action.... No case has ever held that a
record is constitutionally required.").
246 Krent, supra note 245, at 732-33.
247
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52, 561, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Cla-
rence Thomas have joined in recent opinions reducing Congress's Commerce Clause power.
In similar fashion, the Court encroached on Congress's Section 5 Fourteenth Amendment
authority both in Mortison and Kind v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62. 67 (2000).
24'3
 The Court's recent trend of striking laws because of an inadequate congressional
record is highly questionable on precedential, constitutional, and practical grounds. A.
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The Court first narrowly construed congressional Commerce
Clause power in Lopez.249 The case dealt with the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which provided criminal penalties for persons who
knowingly possessed firearms in a school zone. 25° Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the Act unconstitu-
tional.251 The ruling in Lopez was the first time in sixty years the Court
found a federal statute exceeded Congress's power to regulate inter-
state commerce, 252 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion weakened Con-
gress's Commerce Clause power by forgoing the rational basis test in-
quiry and, instead, examining whether the law had a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce. 255
 The Court then found no congres-
sional showing that guns carried in a school zone had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 254 Rehnquist's language also indicated
that the Commerce Clause would henceforth only apply to cases in
volving "economic enterprise."255
Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in dissent, found no basis for de-
viating from the rational basis test. He argued that Congress can regu-
late any activity "significantly (or substantially)" affecting national
commerce. 256
 Justice Breyer pointed out that, contrary to the major-
ity's holding, Commerce Clause cases have not consistently used the
"substantial effects" label: "I use the word 'significant' because the
word 'substantial' implies a somewhat narrower power than recent
precedent suggests. But to speak of 'substantial effect' rather than
'significant effect' would make no difference in this case." 257
Christopher Bryant & Timothy" Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New
"On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Coax ELL L. REV. 328,389 (2001).
249 514 U.S. at 558-68.
255 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (2000) (forbidding individuals from possessing "a firearm
at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
251 Lops, 514 U.S. at 561,
252 hi 1935, the Court had struck a law that regulated the wages and hours of an intra-
state business. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 495,550-51 (1935).
253 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
254 Id. at 561-65.
255 Id. at 558-61.
256 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). At the other end of the spectrum
from Breyer was Justice Clarence Thomas, who regarded the substantial effects test to be an
excessive grant of congressional power: "[W]e must ... respect a constitutional line that does
not grant Congress power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 593
(Thomas.". concurring). He believed the substantial effects test would give Congress practi-
cally limitless power: "Under our jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus 'substantially
affects interstate commerce' statute, purporting to regulate every aspect of human existence,
the Act apparently would be constitutional." Id. at 600 (Thomas,", concurring).
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If the Court had relied on Justice Breyer's reasoning, it likely
would have determined Congress did not exceed its authority. Guns
in schools significantly undermine national education and thus ad-
versely affect interstate and foreign commerce. In addition, Congress
could have legitimately found that, on a national level, guns have a
substantial effect on children's education. The majority's reliance on
the substantial effect test allowed it to second-guess the adequacy of
the congressional record and conclude that possessing guns close to
schools was not a commercial activity. 258
 The Court, ultimately, refused
to rely on the government's claim of expertise.
The decision in Lopez apparently also was based on an
unreflective concern about congressional overreaching. One of "the
implications of the Government's arguments" is that "under the Gov-
ernment's 'national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate
any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody), for example."2" These same concerns equally apply to other
federal statutes directly impacting family life such as the Uniform In-
terstate Family Support Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act. 2" Similarly; traditional federal civil rights claims, such as those
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), often function concurrently
with state remedies for racial or gender cliscrimination. 25i In Lopez, the
Court usurped congressional Commerce Clause powers by granting
itself oversight in an area of decision making that the Constitution
granted to the people's representatives. 2 G2
Five years later, the Court in Morrison relied on Lopez to find un-
constitutional the Violence Against Women Act ("V,AWA"), a federal
statute that provided a private remedy for gender-motivated violence. 263
The Chief Justice again wrote for the majority, further embedding into
jurisprudence his views on the centrality of economics to Congress's
258
 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
258 Id. at 564.
2613
 Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (2003) (easing interstate
child support); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2003)
(providing full faith and credit for child custody decisions).
20
 Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 109, 134-35 (2000).
262
 See Kramer, supra note 227, at 138-41.
'263 42 U.S.C.§ 13981 (1994); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02. 619. 627.
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Commerce Clause power. 264
 Unlike the congressional record on the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress had provided abundant informa-
tion about the interstate effects of gender violence. Nevertheless, the
Court did not find sufficient evidence to prove that violence against
women substantially affected interstate commerce. Even on its face,
without any fact gathering, the connection between the inability of
women to reach their potential when confronted by gender bias ap-
pears obvious. But, instead of relying on presupposition, Congress bol-
stered the factual record with a "mountain of data," including informa-
tion from no less than nine congressional hearings and from gender
bias task forces in twenty-one states, which was amassed over four
years. 265
 The Court's rejection of Congress's inductions from the evi-
dence went beyond Lopez and granted the judiciary even more control
in determining whether congressional findings adequately justify civil
rights laws passed pursuant to the Conunerce Clause.
The Court disregarded the compiled data on the grounds that
violent gender-motivated crimes "are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity."266 This reasoning seems to be a return to judicial
scrutiny reminiscent. of Lochnetera clue process review. 267 To further
curtail congressional overreaching, the Court concluded that Con-
gress could not enact law "based solely on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce. "268 The aggregation doctrine, the
Court held, was inapplicable in cases of gender-motivated violence
that is "not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods in-
volved in interstate commerce."269
264 Chief Justice Rehnquist had made his concerns known years before Morrison, in a
concurring opinion to Hodel u igrginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, where he es-
poused the view that the congressional regulation of commerce should have a 'substantial
effect" on interstate commerce. 452 U.S. 264, 312 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Oth-
erwise, he stated, one could easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal
system exists only at the sufferance of Congress." Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
263 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-31 (Souter, J.. dissenting).
266 Id. at 613.
267 See id. at 644 (Sower, J., dissenting) (Inn the minds of the majority there is a new
animating theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as the old for-
malism had value in the service of an economic conception, the new one is useful in serv-
ing a conception of federalism."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Sauter, J.,
dissenting) ("The resemblance of today's state sovereign inununity to the Lochner era's in-
dustrial due process is striking."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-69 (1996)
(Souterd., dissenting) (comparing recent Supreme Court federalist approaches to Lachne7),
263
 MOMSOn, 529 U.S. at 599.
269 Id. at 617-18.
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The dissents in Morrison, written by Justices David Souter and
Stephen Breyer, sought to restore the rational basis test. 27° Justice
Souter regarded the congressional record on the VAWA as more con-
vincing than those in Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung 271
 Although
the majority did not overrule those two earlier cases, it cast doubt. on
their vitality because Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, just as Morri-
son, involved civil rights protections created on the basis of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority. The Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel de-
termined that racial discrimination had a "disruptive effect . on
commercial intercourse." 272 The Court in McClung found there was
replete testimony that discrimination at restaurants had a "highly re-
strictive effect upon interstate travel by Negroes." 273
 Similarly, Con-
gress documented that gender-based violence often forced victims to
quit jobs and reduced "the mobility of employees and their produc-
tion and consumption of goods shipped in interstate commerce." 274
Given the Court's recent propensity to bevel away at. Congress's
Commerce Clause authority, the Thirteenth Amendment remains an
important alternative for civil rights litigation. A Commerce Clause
approach is unduly susceptible to economic arguments that an intol-
erant act is not substantially connected to interstate commerce. Al-
though the Court found that violence against women is not an eco-
nomically directed activity, that finding is irrelevant in deciding
whether the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
prevent violence against women. The Thirteenth Amendment per-
spective allows congressmen to review the connection of gender-
motivated violence to slavery. Such violence was regularly perpetrated
against slaves on plantations, and women, as Andrew Koppelman has
pointed out, were particularly vulnerable to sexual brutality by masters
and others who exploited their strengths and positions of power. 275
Federal laws relying on the Thirteenth Amendment need only he
rationally related to the vestiges of slavocracy. The Court has never
27° Id. at 637-38, 647-52 (Sauter, J., dissenting) (referring to congressional evidence
that violence against women affects interstate commerce); id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("1 continue to agree with Justice Souter that the Court's traditional 'rational basis' ap-
proach is sufficient.").
271
 Id. at 635 (Sower, J., dissenting) (noting that sexual assault and domestic violence
caused a loss of $3 billion in 1990 and $5 to $10 billion in 1993).
272 379 U.S. at 257.
273 379 U.S. at 300.
274
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 634, 636 (Sauter. J., dissenting).
275
 Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
480, 508-09 (1990).
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overturned the Jones rational basis test. Had Congress at least partly
relied on it, the Court might have deferred to Congress, given legisla-
tive findings that gender-motivated violence is rationally related to the
incidents of servitude and that the VAWA was a necessary and proper
means of dealing with such acts. The only question left for the Court
would then have been whether the VAWA was "reasonably adapted to
the end permitted by the Constitution." 276
The Commerce Clause does little, if anything, to invoke the legacy
of slavery or to look at its remaining manifestations, making it suscepti-
ble to a purely economic interpretation like the one the Rehnquist ma-
jority has adopted. Instead, the Commerce Clause bodes back to what
we may call Lockean social religion, which elevates property above the
Preamble's guarantee to safeguard citizens' life and liberty for the gen-
eral welfare. 277 After all, Congress has had the power to regulate all
manner of commerce between states at least since 1824, pursuant to Gib-
bons v. Ogden, when slavery flourished in the United States. 278 In fact, one
author has argued that the Commerce Clause was an important part of
the Founders' compromise with slavocracy at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. 279 Even though the Clause granted Congress the power to regulate
the slave trade between states, the national government tolerated the
practice, and some antebellum congressmen even owned slaves. 280
By its very terms, the Thirteenth Amendment is not given to a
neutral reading; indeed, it gives the federal legislature the power to
enforce the Liberty guarantees of the Declaration of Independence
and Preamble to the Constitution in the context of both private and
state-sponsored discrimination. Further, the Thirteenth Amendment
extends to interstate and intrastate activities, regardless of the impact
276 Heart of Atlanta	 379 U.S. at 262 (explaining, in the context of the Commerce
Clause, the use of the rational basis test).
277 U.S. CoNs•r. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.").
278 See generally 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 79 PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 24
(1981).
=a° See Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation:
A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. Rum. L. REV. 107, 123 (1997) (stating that Congress
had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate "incoming slave trade" and failure to
do so "owed more to the bad faith of the American people than to any inherent constitu-
tional restraints"); Roberti Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpreta-
tion of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nov. U. L. REV. 695, 702 n.54 (2002) (stating that even if
Congress could not regulate intrastate slave trade it certainly could have done so on an
interstate level).
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on commerce. The Amendment thereby recognizes that the arbitrary
restriction of freedom is not merely an economic harm, but one that
affects society in a more profound way. This does not mean that a
Thirteenth Amendment civil rights approach should displace Com-
merce Clause efforts t inder the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, I
mean to stress the continued vitality of Jones in establishing Congress's
.broad interpretive power at a time when the Court in Lopez and Morri-
son has made the passage of new civil rights legislation increasingly
difficult to justify on Commerce Clause grounds.
The role of the Thirteenth Amendment in employment dis-
crimination cases is illustrative of its importance. The link between
employment discrimination and slavery is obvious, as slavery directly
restricted blacks from choosing professions. Nationally, discriminatory
practices barred blacks from competitive jobs. Congress can, there-
fore, rationally determine that exclusion of a group from equal par-
ticipation in the workplace is related to forced subservience and an
impediment to commerce. Based on this finding, Congress can pass
legislation prohibiting employment discrimination currently not cov-
ered under the scope of federal laws. For instance, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which Congress passed on the basis of its
Commerce Clause powers, is more restrictive than the Thirteenth
Amendment. Title VII permits the federal government to regulate
employers with at least fifteen employees. 281 Employment claims based
on the Thirteenth Amendment need not be so restrictive.
The limited congressional action taken in the employment arena
is promising. Modern day peonage cases were successfully prosecuted
under the Anti-Peonage Act, which Congress passed pursuant to its
Thirteenth Amendment Section 2 authority. 282
 Even absent new legis-
lation, the Supreme Court has already found that § 1981, a Recon-
struction-era statute based on Congress's Thirteenth Amendment
authority, provides a private remedy to persons working for employers
with fewer than fifteen people. 283
 In dictum the Court stated in 1994
281 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2003).
282 See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4. 17 (1944) ("The undoubted aim of the Thir-
teenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti-peonage Act was not merely to end slavery
but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States."); Fox. supra note 144. at 122-23 (noting Congress's interpretive use of its Thir-
teenth Amendment enforcement power in passing the Anti-Peonage Act).
283 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 COR-
NELL L. REV. 596, 601-03 (1988) (discussing the relationship of employment race dis-
crimination claims brought tinder § 1981 and Title VII). The Court has found that the
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that "[e]ven in the employment context, § 1981's coverage is broader
than Title for Title VII applies only to employers with 15 or
more employees, whereas § 1981 has no such limitation."284
At times, the Thirteenth Amendment strategy is also preferable to
the Commerce Clause alternative because of the Amendment's unique
communicative valtte. 285
 Tying discrimination to the economy is not
enough to alter racist views that have, in some circles, been culturally
condoned since the country's founding. A legal framework designed to
protect liberty and improve the general welfare conveys a powerful
message about this country's underlying commitments. Legal norms
can influence a people's desires and interests. They create entitlements
society must honor.286
 Laws protecting human rights on the basis of the
Thirteenth Amendment effectively communicate a federal commit-
ment to prosecuting demagogic conduct resembling the badges of in-
voluntary servitude. Such legal remedies "express recognition of injury
and reaffirmation of the underlying normative principles for how the
relevant [social] relationships are to be constituted." 287
The Thirteenth Amendment is a more obvious source for civil
rights protections than the Commerce Clause. The former , protects in-
dividual autonomy against state and private interference, and recent
Supreme Court decisions indicate the latter principally concerns regu-
lation of interstate economic transactions. The Thirteenth Amendment.
was ratified to increase the federal government's ability to assure uni-
versal freedom and general welfare, and the Commerce Clause was in-
cluded to provide a central authority for regulating commercial inter-
actions across state borders. There is no doubt after McClung and Heart
of Atlanta Motel that the Commerce Clause is also relevant to ending
racist practices—even Lopez and Morrison did not overrule those cases.
With the Court's trend away from its earlier deference to congressional
remedies under Title VII and § 1981 are "separate, distinct, and independent." Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
284 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.. 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) (discussing § 101 of
Civil Rights Act of 1991).
=a' Sec Pope, supra note 229, at 119-20 (describing how words and legal text can facili-
tate "social movement mobilization, dispense symbolic incentives, undermine the legiti-
macy of established social norms, and produce numerous other effects"); Tsesis, supra note
3, at 545-58 (discussing the centrality of symbolism for unifying social movements).
286 See Frances Kahn Zemans, Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of Law in the Political
System, 77 Ant. Pot.. Sci. REV. 690, 697 (1983) (explaining how legal norms influence per-
ceptions of desires, wants, and interests).
287 See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, l48 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1529 (2000).
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Cormnerce Clause authority, however, the Thirteenth Amendment's
centrality has become manifest.
V. THE THIRTEENTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The substantive provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments emerged from the United States' historic commitment
to freedom. The country's primary statements of national purpose,
the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitu-
don, made liberty a foremost guarantee of federal government, but
neither manifesto had an explicit enforcement provision. The makers
of the Constitution, as Justice Louis Brandeis explained in a dissent-
ing opinion, set out "to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.... They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone."288
The Thirteenth Amendment disengages the principle of freedom
from the original Constitution's favoritism for property-owning
whites. The Amendment makes the liberty to live an uncoerced, self-
directed life a universal right. Adopted in the immediate aftermath of
the Civil War, the Amendment was designed both to abolished slavery
and to protect people's right to act independent of arbitrary coer-
cion. Its grant of enforcement authority bestows Congress with the
power to protect the right of individuals to make and pursue mean-
ingful life decisions.
The Fourteenth Amendment too secures normative values essen-
tial to living a good life, although the state action requirement sets a
limit on its effectiveness that the Thirteenth Amendment does not
impose.289 The U.S. Supreme Court has only recently limited the civil
rights potential of the Commerce Clause; on the other hand, Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence was narrowly interpreted at least as
early as the holdings in the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights
Cases 29° The Court's current state-oriented federalism has brought
228 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
289 Sec Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Car Marriage, 25 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 705, 706 (1998) (writing about the rationalist conception of human nature,
considered to be characteristic of the liberty secured under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Note, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality. 12 LAw
& INEQ. 381, 422 (1994) (writing that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands for the promise of a good life).
299 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 18 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
60-63 (1872).
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into sharper relief a comparison between the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
A. Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment Freedoms
Both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments protect plu-
ralistic freedom; nonetheless, each has a unique role in the constitu-
tional scheme. Although this Article is not the appropriate place for a
detailed analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment, some examination
about its relative place to the Thirteenth Amendment will help dem-
onstrate better how these amendments can be integrated. The norma-
tive principles on which they are both established require the federal
government to use its limited power to improve the common good by
protecting individual liberties. 291
To begin, I regard the Thirteenth Amendment to be a more
specific and unequivocal guarantee of civil liberties than the Four-
teenth Amendment. This Part demonstrates that the Thirteenth
Amendment remains the principal constitutional source requiring the
federal government to protect individual liberties against arbitrary
private and public infringements that resemble the incidents of invol-
untary servitude. I believe the Thirteenth Amendment's two sections
take a three-part approach to freedom: its first section guarantees
freedom from arbitrary domination; and its second section authorizes
Congress to enact federal laws protecting people's coequal liberties to
establish meaning for their lives.
The Thirteenth Amendment is an even more unambiguous fed-
eral mandate than the Fourteenth Amendment. The prohibition
against involuntary servitude is absolute, thus any incidents or badges
of it are ineluctably proscribed. The Thirteenth Amendment vests
Congress with the power to protect the unobtrusive exercise of free-
dom against arbitrary infringement. In at least some cases, such as
those involving specific instances of slavery, not even a compelling state
interest can justify a state or private infringement of autonomy.
In contrast, the state may infringe on the personal liberties other-
wise secured under the Fourteenth Amendment where there is an over-
riding public interest. The U.S. Supreme Court, in City of Cleburne v.•
291 I have more fully explained my ethical point of view in TSESIS, supra note 35, at ch.
10. Essentially my view is that the Preamble to the Constitution requires the federal gov-
ernment to protect individual liberties in order to achieve the common good. Sec id.; see
also Alexander Tsesis, Eliminating the Destitution of America's Homeless: A Fair; Federal Approach,
10 TEMP. Pot.. S.; Ctv. Rm. L. REV. 103. 121-23 (2000).
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Cleburne Living Centet; carved out this exception to the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of race, alienage, and national origin
classifications. 292
 Such laws "are subjected to strict scrutiny" analysis and
will only be found constitutional if they "serve a compelling state inter-
est."293
 The Court later clarified that governmental restraints on funda-
mental freedoms must be "specifically and narrowly framed to accom-
plish" the compelling purpose. 294
 Such a restrictive law cannot be
"merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy."295
 In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, a legislature
can abridge fundamental liberty interests for compelling public rea-
sons.29°
The Court's most recent decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment,
adopt a "responsive," rather than a proactive, reading of Congress's
Section 5 powers. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court invalidated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in part because the statute was "so
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior."297
 The case limited Congress's Section 5 powers to
passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees: 298 "The Fourteenth Amendment's history
confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforce-
ment. Clause." The Court's rationale was based on statements made
during congressional debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the effect that "(t)he proposed Amendment. gave Congress too
much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional
structure."299
 In a recent article, Ruth Colker maintained that the Court,
misleadingly resorted to the record of the debates that preceded pas-
sage of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. 30° The Court relied on
the statements of four congressmen to bolster the Boerne rationale
without ever mentioning that only one of them voted for the proposed
292 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
298 1d.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ethic., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986); sec also Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899, 908 (1996).
295
 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
296 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. 721 (1997).
297 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (emphasis added). The Court reiterated this "responsive"
language in Kimd v. Florida Board of Regents. 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000); see infra notes 302-303
and accompanying text.
298 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
299 id. at 520-21.
900 See Colker, supra note 62, at 797-817.
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Fourteenth Amendment."' Relying on the understanding of the
ratification opponents is a dubious method of judicial interpretation.
The Court maintained the remedial interpretation of Congress's
Section 5 power in Kimd v. Florida Board of Regents, finding that Con-
gress overstepped its enforcement authority when it extended the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's ("ADEA") applicability to states
and local governments. 302 The Court in Kimd held that Congress's deci-
sion to apply the ADEA to states was "out of proportion to its sup-
posed remedial or preventive objectives." 303 Other recent cases deal-
ing with Section 5 have applied the responsive "proportionality and
congruency" test to the Patent Remedy Act,3" the VAWA, 3°3 the
Americans with Disabilities Act,"° and the Family and Medical Leave
Act (the "FMLA"). 307
In addition to authorizing laws that responsively remedy specific
acts of past discrimination, the Thirteenth Amendment also grants
Congress the power to pass laws that are substantive guarantees. 308
Pursuant to the Amendment, the standard for passing "effective legis-
lation" is that it be "rationally" related to "the badges and the inci-
dents of servitude." Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the federal
legislature may, and indeed should, pass laws that help liberty thrive.
Congress may use its Section 2 power to pass laws that protect the
non-intrusive use of personal freedom and punish its abridgment.
wi See id. Specifically, in Boerne the Court quoted Representatives Hale, Hotchkiss, and
Rogers, and Senator Stewart. 521 U.S. at 520-21. "Of the Representatives quoted by the
Court, only Representative Hotchkiss voted for ratification of the Amendment. Represen-
tative Hale abstained and Representative Rogers voted against the measure." Colker, so pro
note 62, at 792.
302 528 U.S at 86.
XIS Id. at 82.
30' Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647 (1999) ("The Patent Remedy Act • is particularly incongruous in light of the scant
support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct „ „").
305 United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S 598, 625-26 (2000) ("[Als we have phrased it in
more recent cases, prophylactic legislation under § 5 must have a 'congruence or propor•
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.'") (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
908  Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) ("Congress is the
final authority as to desirable public policy, but in order to authorize private individuals to
recover money damages against the States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by
the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Con-
.
gress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation.").
307 Nevada Delft of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982 (2003) ("We believe
that Congress' chosen remedy, the family-care leave provision of the FMLA, is 'congruent
and proportional to the targeted violation ....'") (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374).
308 iones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
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Moreover, Congress may pass civil legislation, more sensitive to hu-
man rights concerns than §§ 1981 and 1982, allowing for private
compensation. Congress's enforcement power under the Thirteenth
Amendment not only aims proportionately and congruently to pre-
vent interference with fundamental rights, which is the extent of
Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also en-
ables the federal government to substantiate the promises of freedom
found in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble." 9
The Thirteenth Amendment's lack of a state action requirement.
is another reason for sometimes preferring the Thirteenth to the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court created this dichotomy
as early as 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, and has never strayed from it.
The Court then found that the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power is limited to state actions:
It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes
of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action
of state officers executive or judicial, when these are subver-
sive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of pro-
hibition against State laws and Slate proceedings affecting
those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to
legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into ef-
fect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon
3°9 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi•
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). The Court first connected governmental
interference with the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, finc1Mg
that it only protected citizens from state interference with the privileges and immunities of
national, but not state, citizenship. Sec 83 U.S. at 60-63. Likewise, the Equal Protection
Clause prevents interference with the exercise of fundamental rights "tiniest it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those inter-
ests." See. e.g., Zablockiv. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). "The Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause has a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests' ...."
Troxel V. Granville, 530 U.S. 57.57 (2000) (quoting Glucksberg; 521 U.S. at 720).
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such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be di-
rected to the correction of their operation and effect. 31 °
The Civil Rights Cases accorded with post-Reconstruction political de-
cisions, such as the Compromise of 1877, which favored Northern and
Southern reconciliation at the expense of meaningful improvements
for blacks. 311
Boerne took the state action requirement for granted, and further
straight jacketed Congress by finding that Section 5 allows it "to en-
force" but not "to determine what constitutes a constitutional viola-
tion."312 The Supreme Court also embraced the state action require-
ment in United States v. Morrison. 3" Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, explained that the Court would not deviate from "the
time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very
terms, prohibits only state action."314 Morrison asserted that it was
based on the doctrine of stare decisis and the "insight attributable to
the Members of the Court at that time," because they had "intimate
knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment."316 The Court's historical analysis
again failed to account for the events immediately preceding the Civil
Rights Cases. Chief Justice Bradley wrote the decision in the Civil Rights
Cases shortly after he cast the deciding vote on the electoral commis-
sion that gave Rutherford B. Hayes the presidency and secured the
Compromise of 1877.316 Bradley and the other members of the elec-
toral commission abandoned blacks to the injustices of segregation.
The Rehnquist majority drew on precedent filled with racist un-
dertones instead of advancing progressive arguments born from the
abolitionist movement. The Court, in Morrison, also quoted from an-
other 1883 case, United States v. Harris, for the principle that Section 5
refers to "[s] tate action exclusively, and not to any action of private
310 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12.
311 See supra note 102.
313 521 U.S. at 533.
313 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). Both Boerne and lifonisort failed to evaluate the Court's in-
terpretation of "enforce" in Thirteenth Amendment cases, relying instead on the Civil Rights
Cases "niggard]" interpretation of that term. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination
Agenda, 111  VALE L.J. 1141, 1154-56 (2002).
314 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
310
 Id. at 622.
316 Fox, supra note 144, at 159. From that year, the Court began using the Constitution
to avoid the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485,
488-89 (1877) (finding Louisiana violated the Commerce Clause by requiring the deseg-
regation of public conveyance).
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individuals."317
 Hanis struck section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, which
had made it criminal for two or more people to conspire to deprive
anyone from enjoying the equal protection of the law or the privileges
and immunities of national citizenship. 318
 The Court's continued reli-
ance on these two decisions, both of which moved the country in the
direction of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), indicates the present-clay
difficulty of using a Fourteenth Amendment strategy to end injustices
like violence against women or hate crimes generally.
Ever since it decided the Slaughter-House Cases, Civil Rights Cases,
and Harris, the Court has severely handicapped national power in the
area of the Fourteenth Amendment. But beginning with Jones, the
Court expanded federal authority to prevent interference with civil
liberties.
The schema proposed herein authorizes Congress to pass laws
preserving the right to freely pursue goals that do not arbitrarily in-
terfere with others' legitimate interests. This schema provides both a
positive grant of power, in so far as it recognizes that the Thirteenth
Amendment provides Congress the power to expand opportunities,
and a negative grant of freedom, because it prohibits the government
and individuals from intrusively abusing others' autonomy. Such a
perspective makes more evident Congress's authority to decide ra-
tionally that a law, such as the VAWA, is necessary for protecting
women's freedom of movement. against misogynistic intrusions into
their lives. A law against other hate crimes would likewise use federal
power to punish and prevent. the types of interference with liberty
that the Reconstruction Congress sought to end.
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment. provides a substantive alterna-
tive for passing civil rights laws. This interpretation of the Amend-
ment. is based on Supreme Court. precedent. The Supreme Court has
consistently found that the Thirteenth Amendment does not. contain
any equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment's state action require-
ment, Congress has great latitude, pursuant to its Thirteenth
Amendment Section 2 power, to end any remaining vestiges of servi-
tude and their concomitant forms of subordination. The judiciary, I
argued above, should use Section 1 even absent congressional ac-
tion. 319
 The practices to which both sections of the Thirteenth
Amendment apply are usually not overtly tied to forced labor; they
317
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (quoting Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1883)) (internal quo-
tations omitted).
318 106 U.S. at 644.
919 See supra Part III.B.
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may be masked in institutional discrimination and private behavior
that arbitrarily denies victims the opportunity to live meaningful lives.
B. Pertinent Rights
The Supreme Court has clone little to examine what civil liberties
Congress may protect. pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. In-
stead, the Court has used various constitutional provisions to establish
its decisions concerning privacy and liberty rights. For example, the
Court has held repeatedly that liberty rights are imbedded in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives the Court
little guidance about which liberties it protects. 32° Typically, the Court
simply asserts that a human decision, such as choosing whether to
travel, is a historically fundamental liberty that is immune from state
infringement absent a compelling state interest. 321 This kind of un-
specific historical reasoning exposes holdings to the originalist detrac-
tion that courts are engaging in judicial lawmaking. 322 Critics of opin-
ions such as Roe v. Wade have called the Court's reflective method
"unprincipled," "illegitimate," and lacking "connection with any value
32° See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-500 (1977) (determin-
ing that the right of family members to live together was a family liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause); Cleveland Ed. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (stat-
ing that "(0 his Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding that certain
privacy rights are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but Implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1971) (holding that patient
identification requirements of a substance abuse act did not violate "any right or liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
321 See Zabel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("In light
of the. unquestioned historic recognition of the principle of free interstate migration, and
of its role in the development of the Nation, we need not feel impelled to 'ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.'" (quoting
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969))); Dunn v. Bluinstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335,
360 (1972) (finding the right to travel a fundamental right that the state cannot withhold
absent a substantial and compelling reason); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972) (finding that loafing and strolling are "historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them").
322 See. e.g.. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATFER OF INTERPRETA-
'110N: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 24-25, 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing for an
originalist constitutional interpretation). For an originalist denial of liberty rights, see
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (stating that "[title Court is most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution"), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
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of the Constitution."323 A Thirteenth Amendment approach sidesteps
these criticisms because, instead of an intuitive assertion, it requires a
finding that an abridgement of liberty is significantly connected to the
incidents or badges of servitude. 324
The legality of protecting liberties through the Thirteenth
Amendment is difficult to gainsay because interpreting the Amend-
ment begins with the historical injustice it ended. My approach is
analogous to the Supreme Court's two-tiered analytic method in sub-
stantive due process cases:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those lindamental rights and liberties
which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" .... Second, we have required in substantive-due-
process cases a "careful description" of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest, Our Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for re-
sponsible decisionmaking" . . This approach tends to rein
in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due
process judicial review. 325
Similarly, courts adjudicating matters under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment must compare contemporary harms to past practices. Once the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of involuntary servitude, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the limitation on indi-
vidual liberty is no more restrictive than is necessary to protect. the
public's ability to live freely.
Protecting essential freedoms means ending coercive practices
and enabling people to make reasonable choices. Using the Thir-
teenth Amendment for that end would be a legitimate use of gov-
ernmental power to provide for the common good. Only civic re-
quirements, such as jury duty, public highway work, or military service
3=3 John Hart. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo/fi.A Comment on Roe v, Wade, 82 VALE	 920,
949 (1973); see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 INn.
U. 1,7-12 (1971) (making similar observations regarding Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)),
324
 Along similarly historical grounds, Andrew Koppelman has argued that the Thir-
teenth Amendment secures a woman's right to abort pregnancy. Koppehnan, supra note
275, at 483.
525 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-22 (internal citations omitted).
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during just war, are legitimate reasons for requiring people to act
against their will. 326
Every generation must develop an understanding of fundamental
freedoms by critically examining the nation's past, its core documents,
and its moral standing as a constitutional democracy. This mode of col-
lective self-reflection aims at achieving empathic decision making that
avoids past injustices. Freedom is a progressive civic condition that best
expands through an affective comprehension of moral obligations and
social limitations. I take it as a given that persons are relational animals
who innately empathize and therefore can understand fellow citizens'
desire to achieve goals without coercion or arbitrary domination. Con-
stitutional development should never come at the cost of human
autonomy and social welfare; otherwise, it would interfere with the rea-
sonable goals of individuals' living in a community of equals. Neverthe-
less, some limits on freedom are necessary in organized societies where
people often have conflicting goals. Normative principles are critical to
constructing laws for a pluralistic society. To avoid religious or philo-
sophical absolutism, the Thirteenth Amendment requires a historical
basis for asserting that an interest falls under the Amendment's pur-
view.
Legislation against acts of domination, whether they are perpe-
trated during employment or in other settings, is essential in a coun-
try devoted to civil liberties. Laurence H. Tribe has pointed out that
based on existing case law
Congress possesses an almost unlimited power to protect in-
dividual rights under the Thirteenth Amendment. Seem-
ingly, Congress is free within the broad limits of reason, to
recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement
of those rights as a form of domination or subordination and
thus an aspect of slavery; and proscribe such infringement as
a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 327
Likewise, the Supreme Court should adjudicate cases implicating per-
sonal liberties through the lens of the Thirteenth Amendment. In or-
der to provide consistency and predictability to citizens and litigants,
326 See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 n.11 (1973) (asserting that a
compensation of $1 a day for jury duty does not amount to involuntary servitude); Selec-
tive Draft Law Cases. 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (discussing a military draft).
327 1 LAURENCE H. 'NIUE, AMERICAN CONS'ITEUT1ONA1. LAW § 5-15, at 926-27 (3d ed.
2000).
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both the legislature and judiciary should use a normative historical
analysis.
The Thirteenth Amendment approach can sharpen judicial deci-
sions concerning the extent to which persons may enjoy fundamental
rights, particularly when the exercise of those rights conflicts with the
interests of other members of a pluralistic community. The basis of
such an analysis need not be ad hoc; instead, it should be based on the
recognition that slavery and involuntary servitude were inimical to
fundamental, human liberties. The woefully incomplete post-Civil War
American project involves ending racist. practices. Twentieth-century
Court decisions on constitutionally protected liberty and privacy rights
reflect this trend. Those rights, however, are not absolute. To the con-
trary, the Thirteenth Amendment bars certain uses of freedom, par-
ticularly those used for domination. After all, in 1857, the Court fa-
vored Dred Scott's master's interest in free interstate travel with slave
property to Dred Scott's interest in freedom from slavery. 328 The Thir-
teenth Amendment made the exploitative use of power an unconstitu-
tional abuse of freedom,
Liberty rights are well established in United States jurisprudence.
The Court has often invoked the Due Process Clause and Equal Pro-
tection Clause in privacy rights cases; the Court, however, has not al-
ways provided even this degree of specificity.329 Its frequent resort to
tradition provides little explanation for the protection of fundamental
rights."" The Thirteenth Amendment is a more explicit guarantee of
freedom than other constitutional provisions on which the Court has
relied. For instance, Roe, upholding a woman's right to choose an
abortion, relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty provision and
endorsed the district court's view that the source of that right is the
Ninth Amendment."' Although the Court in Roe did provide an ex-
pansive historical analysis to justify its conclusion, its reliance on tradi-
tion was a two-edged sword because the dissent also resorted to tradi-
tion to derive the opposite point of view on the right to abortion 332
328 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, GO U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-52 (1857). The Court con-
centrated both on the master's liberty and property interest. See SUPII7 text accompanying
note 42.
For instance, in Shapiro the Court ascribed the right to travel to "a particular consti-
tutional provision." 394 U.S. at 630.
338 Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone!, 53 HASTINGS	 987, 990
(2002).
331 410 U.S. at 153.
332 Id. at 179-77 (Rehnquist,]., dissenting) (reviewing state statutes limiting abortion
which were in place in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted); see Adam B.
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Without a specific nexus on which a court must ground refer-
ences to tradition, privacy rights cases rely on the predispositions of
judges, and when racists like Chief Justice Taney sit on the Supreme
Court, decisions like Dred Scott are the product. To prevent the hijack-
ing of tradition, the Thirteenth Amendment requires a very clear ju-
dicial analysis: Is the act an incident or badge of servitude? Or, in the
case of legislation, did Congress rationally determine that the statute
was a necessary and proper means to end an incident of servitude?
The rather obvious shortcoming of this method is that the antagonist
of a particular law or judgment can argue that it is unrelated to invol-
untary servitude. Such criticism does little, however, to limit the virtu-
ally plenary power that the Supreme Court found Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment grants to Congress. 333 Moreover, in spite of
the Amendment's specific focus, it allows for a broad reading.
Familial liberties are principal examples of how Thirteenth
Amendment analysis works outside the context of contract and prop-
erty rights cases, where the Amendment has most commonly been
applied.334 Indeed, the first use of the term "incidents of servitude,"
which Senator James Harlan of Iowa coined during the 1864 Senate
debate on the Amendment, came within the context of slavery's det-
riments to marriage: Tr] lie prohibition of the conjugal relation is a
necessary incident of servitude."3" If Harlan was correct, then the
federal guarantee to marry the partner of one's choice is linked to the
rights of free people. Traditionally, however, the Court has located the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" in the Due
Process Clause. 336
Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101, 131
(2002) ("While the majority opinion in Roc never explicitly stated that it was relying on
tradition to find the fundamental right to an abortion, its nearly twenty-page discussion of
the history of abortion precedes its finding that there is such a fundamental right."). An-
drew Koppelman has argued that "[w] hen women are compelled to carry and bear chil-
dren, they are subjected to 'involuntary servitude' in violation of the thirteenth amend-
ment." Koppleman, supra note 275, at 484. The Court also stated that proscriptions against
consensual homosexual conduct are constitutional, in part because they "have ancient
roots." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94. In Lawrence, the Court found this historical assertion to
have been invalid. 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
333 See .supra text accompanying notes 167-180.
331 See generally, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Jones, 392 U.S. at 409.
333 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
336 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Poe, the Court
considered a challenge to a Connecticut law against the use of contraceptives and dis-
missed for lack of standing. Id. at 507-08.
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Choice of a marriage partner is fundamental because it reflects so
many aspects of an individual's character traits. Family rights issues pro-
vide further insight into why the Thirteenth Amendment is as relevant
to protecting civil liberties as the Due Process Clause. Both involve a
continuum of interests not subject to any "substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints." 337 Denying adults the right to family
autonomy signifies a lack of respect for the individuals' decisions, pas-
sions, hopes, and sense of self. Moreover, in this country arbitrary dep-
rivation of family freedoms is linked to slavery.
In both the antebellum and postbellum South, slaves were de-
graded to a social rung below whites. Intermarriage was forbidden to
them, and even marriages between free blacks and slaves were only
permitted at the slave owners' behests. 338 A typical argument against
abolition was that it would lead to miscegenation. 339 A back-country
farmer's attitude was typical:
[H]ow'd you like to hev a nigger steppin' up to your darter?
Of course you wouldn't; and that's the reason I wouldn't like
to hey 'em free; but I tell you, I don't think it's right to hey 'em
slaves so; that's the fac—taant right to keep 'em as they is. 34°
The Supreme Court held that antimiscegenation laws violated
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in the 1967 case of Lov-
ing v. Virginia."' The Court. recognized the right. to marry "as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."342 Prohibitions against intermarriage are also related to
slavery and subservience. Any arbitrary burdens placed on marriage
formation implicate the Thirteenth Amendment.
The abolition of slavery further rejected the racist stereotype that
made black families subject to personal and legislative whims. Any
9" Id. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"8 Arnold A. Sio, Interpretations of Ninety: The Slave Status in the A meneas. 7 COMP. STUD,
Soc'v & HtsT. 289, 297 (1965); sec William L. Lees. The Legal Status of Free Negroes and Slaves
in Tennessee, 4 J. NEGRO Hum 254, 262 (1919); see alsojoriN H. RUSSELL, THE FISEE NEGRO
IN VIRGINIA, 1619-1865, at 126 (Negro University Press 1969) (1913) (stating that even
after emancipation, blacks were distanced from whites by their lack of interaction and
intermarriage).
999 Sec Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864, 34 .1. NEGRO Nis• -.
274, 282-83 (1949) (explaining how miscegenation became an issue against Republicans
during the 1864 national election).
919 CARL N. DEGLER, OUT of OUR PAST; Tilt FORCES TDAT SHAPED MODERN AMERICA
167 (1959).
341 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
m 5 Id. at 12.
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contemporary burdens on familial living arrangements that resemble
the hardships faced by slave families are unconstitutional Black fami-
lies in the antebellum South faced great obstacles to maintaining sta-
ble family relationships. Limits on slave families severely hampered
personal choices and caused enormous misery. 545 Many masters con-
sidered slave marriages only temporary and subject to forced termina-
tion. 344 Because all southern states forbade blacks from entering into
formal marriage contracts, masters had an absolute right to sell one
or both spouses. When slaves married persons on other plantations or
free blacks, they were limited in how often they could visit their
spouses. Spouses who lived on different plantations were even more
likely to be sold apart than those with a common owner, and even
when they remained on nearby plantations, their new masters some-
times prevented them from contacting spouses. 345
The dominant stereotype claiming that blacks were indifferent to
family life proved groundless. 346 During and after the Civil War, many
freedpersons wandered far off plantations in search of loved ones.
Ben Dodson, a sixty-five-year-old plantation preacher, cried out in joy
when he was reunited with his wife after years of estrangement result-
ing from their master's decision to sell them separately: "Glory! glory!
hallalujahl Dis is my Betty, shuah," he said, glancing again at her face
to reassure himself. "I fowl' you at las'. I's hunted an' hunted till I
track you up here. I's boring to hunt till I fin' you if you's alive."547 Af-
ter emancipation, parents were reunited with children, often not rec-
343 Sec E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Slave Family. 15 J. NEGRO HisT, 198, 246 (1930)
(discussing the inability of slaves to attain any civil effects of marriage).
344 See Jo Ann Nlanfra & Robert R. Dykstra, Serial Marriage and the Origins of the Black
Stepfamily: The Rowanty Evidence, 72 J. AM. HIST. 18, 34-35 (1985) (providing statistics indi-
cating that force accounted for the termination of about one-third of slave marriages, and
that of those marriages that were dissolved forcefully, about one-third were unions of five
or more years, and about half produced offspring); see also JonN W. BLASSINGAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTA -FION LIFE IN '111F. ANTEBELLUM SOLVIll 91 (1972) (providing
similar statistics and concluding that of 2888 slave families, 32.4% were separated force-
fully within six years of their marriage).
345 Steven E. Brown, Sexuality and the Slave Community, 42 PityLoN 1, 6 (1981),
346 This dehumanizing attitude is found repeatedly in apologetics for slave trading. A
typical view was that "rwlith regard to the separation of husbands and wives, parents and
children  [n]egroes are themselves both perverse and comparatively indifferent about
this matter," James H. Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist, in 'DIE IDEOLOGY or SLAV-
ERY 191-92 (Drew G. Faust ed., 1981).
347 LAURA S. HAVILAND, A WOMAN'S LIFE-WORK 463 (Mnemosyne Publishing Co.
1969) (1881).
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ognizing each other but for a scar or some other unusual feature 348
Sometimes they discovered their newly found loved ones had been
brutalized during the years of slavery that. separated them. One
woman located her eighteen-year-old daughter, who had been sold
from her, to have been cut "[from her head to her feet ... just as
her face. "349
The variety of chores on big plantations also often resulted in
family separation, especially among extended family members. If one
family member worked in the plantation house, he could not live with
those members of his family who worked in the fields. The most dev-
astating form of family disruption came from sales, which had even
less regard for extended family relationships than for parental or
spousal relationships. 55°
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits such disruptions to family
structure. The Amendment complements due process jurisprudence
and expands the scope of prohibited conduct. In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, the Supreme Court found the Due Process Clause grants
extended families the right to live together. 351 The Court recognized
that "the institution of family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition:552 The Thirteenth Amendment yields added protec-
tion of this fundamental right. Pursuant to Section 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, Congress can prohibit private and state interfer-
ence with family living arrangements. 353
In another relevant context, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut
further guaranteed the protection of family rights. 551
 Marriage, the
Court observed, "promotes a way of life ... a harmony of living ...
bilateral loyalty:555 The Court based its decision on "several constitu-
tional guarantees" of liberties that contain "penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that. help give them life and sub-
348
 THE AMERICAN SLAVE: A COMPOSITE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 274 (George P. Rawick ed.,
1975).
818 Letter from Lucy Chase to Miss Lowell (Nov. 29, 1863), in DEAR  ONES AT HOME 99
(Henry L. Swint ed., 1966).
35° See KOLCIIIN. supra note 181, at 125-26.
351 431 U.S. at 499.
352 Id. at 503-04.
353
	 Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether § 1982 applies to
housing exempt from the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Several lower courts have held that
housing is covered by § 1982. Sec Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303, 1304 (7th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Zaremha, 381 F. Supp. 165, 167-68 (N.D. 111. 1973).
334 381 U.S. at 484-86.
355 Id. at 485-86.
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stance."356 In particular, the Court found a right to marital liberty in
the Due Process Clause.357 The Connecticut anti-contraception law
was an affront to the marital relationship because it enabled the state
to interfere with the intimate rights of spouses. 358
Justice William Douglas's majority opinion in Griswold has been
the subject of a variety of criticisms that would not apply to a Thir-
teenth Amendment approach. One critic of the decision was Justice
Hugo Black, who wrote in a dissenting opinion that the majority
based its decision on the ambiguities of procedural due process. Jus-
tice Black rejected the decision because he could "find in the Consti-
tution no language which either specifically or implicitly grants to all
individuals a constitutional 'right to privacy.'" 359 Similarly, Robert H.
Bork criticized the Griswold reasoning for failing "every test of neutral-
ity .... Griswold . . . is an unprincipled decision, both in the way in
which it derives a new constitutional right and the way it defines that
right, or rather fails to define it."360
Gristoo/d's critics, however, fail to realize that finding substantive
guarantees to family privacy does not require novel legal reasoning.
Substantive guarantees, like the First Amendment's guarantee of relig-
ious liberty and the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause's
guarantee of property rights, are strewn about the Bill of Rights. 361
The Thirteenth Amendment's substantive guarantee of marital free-
dom is another reason critics are mistaken. The liberty to choose a
spouse is grounded in its historic setting and the organic nature of
constitutional interpretation. The Thirteenth Amendment facilitates
Justice Felix Frankfurter's vision of the Constitution as a "stream of
history," which the Supreme Court directs within "a living framework"
for growth.362 Likewise, the Amendment is compatible with Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's view that "[al prime part of the history of our
356 1d. at 484.
357 See id. at 481-83.
358 Id, at 480, 485-86.
369 HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAFIll 9 (1968). Thus, he thought, the states
could invade privacy rights "unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision." Id.
3e10 Bork, supra note 323, at 7-11.
361 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Penistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1980) (arguing that there is a '`stubbornly substantive character of
so many of the Constitution's most crucial commitments: commitments defining the values
that we as a society, acting politically, must respect. Plainly, the First Amendment's guaran-
tee of religious liberty and its prohibition of religious establishment are substantive in this
sense. So, too, is the Thirteenth Amendment, in its abolition of slavery ....").
362 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); FELIX FRANK-
FURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL TANEY AND WAITE 2 (1937).
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Constitution ... is the story of the extension of constitutional rights
and protections to people once ignored and excluded,"363
The Thirteenth Amendment could have further bolstered Justice
Arthur Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold, which convinc-
ingly argued that. the Ninth Amendment's sweeping protection of un-
enumerated rights includes marital privacy rights. 364
 The Amendment
unequivocally condemns laws and practices that intrude on marital
autonomy because such restrictions resemble the coercion of involun-
tary servitude. The Thirteenth Amendment's first section provides
the judiciary with the power to hear cases against individuals, officials,
or governmental entities who use arbitrary' characteristics, such as
race, to intrude on conjugal rights. 365
The Thirteenth Amendment is relevant in other family autonomy
contexts as well. Its applicability is clear, for example, in the area of
parental autonomy over children's education, Theodore Weld, in
1839, exclaimed that enslaved parents had "as little control over [their
children] as have domestic animals over the disposal of their
young. "366 Slave parents were particularly restrained from educating
their children. Indeed, many states forbade slaves from receiving any
form of education.367 Parents hekl in bondage were altogether pro-
hibited from teaching their children to read and write. Such a prac-
tice prohibited parents from helping offspring achieve their potential
for private and public accomplishments.
As we saw earlier, the Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary rec-
ognized the Thirteenth Amendment's applicability to parental deci-
865 United States V. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 557 (1996) (citing IttcnAttn MORRIS, Tin:
FORGING or THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)).
361 See 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg4, concurring).
363 FRANKFURTER, supra note 362, at 2; Felix Frankfurter, Taft and the Supreme Court. in
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON '1111: SUPREME COURT: EVIRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND
THE CONSTITUTION 49, 61 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970).
366 WELD, supra note 76. at 56.
367
 Some African Americans did learn clandestinely, many of them with the help of
sympathetic or self-interested whites. African Americans often demonstrated resourceful-
ness in using linguistic skills to elevate themselves from slavery and cultural prejudices. See
Kimberly Rae Connor, To Disembark: The Slave Narrative Tradition, 30 ArR.-Am. REv. 35, 36
(1996); Joyce E. Williams & Ron Ladd, On the Relevance of Education for Black Liberation, 47J.
NEGRO En. 266, 266 (1978). In the South, general education for blacks began only in 1861
in Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Ellis 0. Knox, A Historical Sketch of Secondary Education for
Negroes, 9 J. NEGRO En. 440, 445 (1940). Masters would sometimes amputate the digits of
slaves whom they caught learning to read, Janet Cornelius, "11'e Slipped and Learned to
Read": Slave Accounts of the Literacy Process, 1830-1865, 44 Ptivt.oN1 171, 174 (1983). Whiles
usually helped blacks, like Charity Jones, who learned to read and write. Id. at 176. These
'teachers' were typically the adolescent playmates of blacks. Id.
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sions over their children's education. 368 The plaintiffs were parents
who wanted to contract for education with a private school. The
Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited the school
from refusing to enroll the children on racial grounds. 369 The Court
concluded that parents have the liberty right to enter contractual
agreements with the school of their choosing.
The Court could have refined its reasoning with a discussion of
the disadvantages that slaves faced and the Act's liberating purposes.
Rather than basing its decision on contract rights, the Court should
have defined the universal human right to educate one's children.
After all, parents' rights go well beyond the right to contract for their
children's education and include a privacy interest in improving their
children's lives.
Indeed, a whole series of parental autonomy cases fit the Thir-
teenth Amendment's criteria so well as to make it plausible that courts
could find unconstitutional arbitrary restrictions on parental auton-
orm; even absent congressional action. This would require the Court to
recognize that Section 1 grants the judiciary deliberative powers, which,
in turn, could have significant ramifications on litigants' ability to sue
under the Amendment, especially in those circumstances where Con-
gress has failed to address educational discrimination.
Other parental autonomy cases regarding educational issues do
rely on broad historical reasoning that the Thirteenth Amendment
can buttress. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck clown a state law
that forbade teaching students a language other than English before
they finished the eighth grade. 37° The Court relied on the liberty pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause and decided the law violated the
parents' right to decide how to educate their children. 371 The decision
is somewhat ambiguous because the majority did not attempt "to
define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed: 172 The Court pro-
vided a more useful criterion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court
invalidated a state law requiring children to attend school until the
age of sixteen.373 The Court held that the law violated Amish parents'
366 427 U.S. at 175-77; see suprzt notes 175-180 and accompanying text.
369 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168, 172-73 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment granted
Congress the authority to pass § 1981, which "prohibits racial discrimination in the making
and enforcement of private contracts").
370 262 U.S. 390. 396-97,403 (1923).
371 Id. at 399-400, 403.
372 Id. at 399.
373 406 U.S. 205, 207, 213-15 (1972).
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rights to exercise parental control and religious authority. 374 The
Court stated that "[dile history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and up-
bringing of their children: 375 Using similar reasoning in Santosky v.
Kramer; the Court noted "IA he fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child." 37° And
it reiterated the "historical recognition that freedom of personal
choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment."377
The Court clothed these cases in the historical recognition that
the government must not interfere with parental decisions absent a
compelling state interest.. Thirteenth Amendment analysis could better
link that aspect of American legal history to specific constitutional
landmarks. Such an analysis would reflect on the institutional denial of
parental autonomy in the antebellum United States and consider criti-
cally whether barring parents from particular educational or custody
decisions resembles the conditions of involuntary servitude. The libera-
tion from slavery extended to all parents the freedom to make critical
decisions about their children's education. The Thirteenth Amendment
approach, then, may be even better grounded in U.S. history than the
one based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment
sifts through specifics rather than generalities and has the further advan-
tage of providing a cause of action against public and private schools.
I am not advocating abandoning the generalities of the Four-
teenth Amendment where they are applicable. The point, rather, is
that many parental autonomy cases that typically are analyzed under
the Fourteenth Amendment could be made less vulnerable to criti-
cism by bringing the Thirteenth Amendment's self-executing first sec-
tion into the judgment or, preferably, by enacting federal family pro-
tections pursuant to the second section. 378
374 Id. at 232-33.
373 Id. at 232.
"0 455 U.S. 745.753 (1982).
377 Id.
978 Federal family protection passed under the Thirteenth Amendment should focus
on private acts. The Court recently held that sovereign immunity does not shield a state
from complying with the FMLA. Hibbs, 123 S. Cr. at 1974. The Court determined that
Congress's use of its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power in order to prevent gender
discrimination under the FMLA was congruent or proportional to the injury the Act for-
bids and the means adopted to that end. Id. The Court stated:
Unlike the statutes at issue in City of Boerne, Kind, and Garirtt, which applied
broadly to every aspect of state employers' operations, the FMLA is narrowly
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Although greater methodological certainty makes the Thirteenth
Amendment an attractive alternative for civil rights strategists, it is not
the best alternative for all cases related to family life and reproduction.
Some cases do not fall under the Amendment's ambit, even though at
first they seem to fit it. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court
appropriately resorted to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to find an Oklahoma law requiring "habitual
criminals" to undergo sterilization violated their fundamental right to
procreate. 379 "We are dealing here" the majority wrote, "with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and pro-
creation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. "380 The decision remains open to critics like Bork, who criticized
the Court for failing adequately to ground the right to procreate,
thereby enabling judges to exploit "substantive equal protection" to
"embed their notions of public policy in the Constitution." 381 Bork's
criticism would be entirely inapplicable to a Thirteenth Amendment
prohibition against the arbitrary infringement of liberty rights. His tex-
tualist argument, which rests on the premise that there is no constitu-
tional guarantee to procreate, comes undone at the infusion of Thir-
teenth Amendment analysis. Masters interfered with many aspects of
their slaves' procreation. They castrated slaves with relative equanimity
because it. was generally considered a medical procedure that masters
could perform on chattel:382 Further, some states permitted castration
targeted at the fault line between work and family—precisely where sex-based
overgeneralization has been and remains strongest—and affects only one as-
pect of the employment relationship. Also significant are the many other
limitations that Congress placed on the FMLA's scope.
Id. at 1975. The FMLA, the Court continued,
applies only to employees who have worked for the employer for at least one year
and provided 1,250 hours of service within the last 12 months, § 2611(2) (A); and
does not apply to employees in high-ranking or sensitive positions, including
state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers, §§ 2611(2) (B) (1)
and (3), 203(e) (2) (C)).
Id. No such restriction is applicable to the Thirteenth Amendment because it prohibits all
incidents and badges of servitude, regardless of the employer's characteristics or the time
for which a victim was exploited.
879 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942).
380 Id. at 541.
381 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMP'I1NG Or AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCI1ON Or THE
LAW 63-64 (1990).
me Barbara L. Bernier, Class, Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies and Socio-Political
Choices, 11 HA'. BLAcarrrER I.J. 115, 121 (1994).
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as part of the punishment for black rape of white yvomen. 383 Thus,
impediments to procreation interfere with a free life.
In spite of this seeming fit, the problem of using the Thirteenth
Amendment in cases like Skinner or Turner v. Salley, which found that
prisoners retain the right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment,
is that they both dealt with prisoners' rights. 384
 Even where limiting
marriage and procreation rights has some resemblance to the incidents
of servitude, the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment does not.
protect persons who have been duly convicted of crimes. 385
 This is a
disturbing conclusion for human rights activism, making the Four-
teenth Amendment the best means for convicted criminals to proclaim
their limited right to exercise fundamental freedoms. Further, it pres-
ents a dilemma that can be rectified only by amending the Thirteenth
Amendment's exception for the use of involuntary servitude as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."386
A historically based interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
also protects liberty rights other than those linked to family relations.
Right-to-travel cases further indicate that the Thirteenth Amendment
is a substantive guarantee of freedom. Justice William Douglas found
the right to travel abroad and within the United States was "a part of
our heritage" that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects.387
 In Kent v. Dulles, he explained the subtle nature of that right:
"Travel abroad, like travel within the country; may be necessary for a
livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice
of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in
our scheme of Nuittes."88
 Justice Douglas did not, however, provide a
reason for finding that right in the Bill of Rights. 389
 Indeed, slaves' in-
583
 JORDAN, supra note 24, at 154, 156, 473.
584 See Turner. 482 U.S. 78. 91 (1987).
585
 "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNs .r. amend. XIII. § 1.
588
 The Senate Committee of the judiciary, under the leadership of Lyman Trumbull.
borrowed the first clause of the Thirteenth Amendment from the Northwest Ordinance of
1787. See HORACE WRITE, TUE LIFE OF LYNIAN TRUMBULL 224 (1913).
387
 See Liens v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1958). justice Douglas had along-standing
commitment to civil rights. Drew S. Days III, William 0. Douglas and Civil Rights, in "HE
SHALL NOT PASS Tills WAY AGAIN": TIM LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 109-17
(Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990) (documenting Justice Douglas's civil rights opinions and the
Court's responses).
388 357 U.S. at 126.
"9 See id. at 126-27.
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ability to freely travel without their masters' permission indicates that
the Fifth Amendment did not adequately protect that right.
Slaves were restricted from relocating. Even those slaves who
worked for their masters outside the homestead or plantation only
traveled at the masters' sufferance. 39° After liberation, many blacks
wandered in the country and settled in cities away from their planta-
tions. The newly freed people desired freedom from manacles and the
ability to live and work where they wished. Often they were financially
strapped, but preferred freedom to the security of their old homes.
This was the situation Sidney Andrews found during his travels in
1866, while reporting on the defeated South . 591 Throughout Georgia
he found many freedpeople who were living in destitution after leav-
ing their former homes. 392 "Who shall have the heart to blame them?"
Andrews asked rhetorically. 393 "For they were in search of nothing less
noble and glorious than freedom. They were in rags and wretched-
ness, but the unquenchable longing of the soul for liberty was being
satisfied."394 Andrews asked one elderly woman why she had left a mis-
tress who "would have given you a good home as long as you live." 395
To the freewoman the response seemed obvious, "What fur? 'Joy my
freedom."396 In another place, he found eleven people living in a but
with rags for bedding. 397 To Andrews's inquiry about whether he had
a kind master, an elderly inhabitant responded, "I's had a berry good
master, mass's', but ye see I's wanted to be free man." 398
Another narrative tells of an elderly slave, named Si, who left a
plantation one night with his wife. 399 In the morning, the master came
across Si bending down in a nearby forest by his deceased wife, who
390 Slaves who left their masters' homesteads or plantations were required to carry passes
or wear badges. Christopher Morris, The Articulation of Two Worlds: The Master-Slave Relation-
ship Reconsidered, 85 J. Am. Hisr. 982, 1000 (1998); Robert Starobin, Disciplining Industrial
Slaves in the Old South, 53 J. NEGRO Hisr. 111, 114 (1968). Literate slaves wrote passes for
themselves and others, always subject to severe disciplinary measures if they were discovered.
See David Waldstreicher, Reading the Runaways: Self-Fashioning, Print Culture, and Confidence in
Slavery in the Eighteenth-Century Mid-Atlantic, 56 Wm. V.: MARY Q. 243, 263 (1999).
991
 SIDNEY ANDREWS, THE SOU'Ill SINCE THE WAR 350-53 (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1971) (1866).
992 Id. at 350-51,
393 Id.
394 Id. at 351-53.
395 Id.
399 ANDREWS, supra note 391, at 350-51.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 OCTAVIA V. ROGERS ALBERT, Houst: OF BONDAGE 134-35 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988)
(1890).
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had died of exposure. 4" "'Uncle Si, why on earth did you so cruelly
bring Aunt Cindy here for, through all of such hardship, thereby caus-
ing her death?' Lifting up his eyes and looking his master full in the
face, he answered, 'I couldn't help it, marster; but then, you see, she
died free.*"401
After the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. in 1865,
states could no longer arbitrarily deny citizenship or access into their
borders. Senator Trumbull explained during an 1866 congressional
debate that the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement power allowed
Congress to pass laws that would, in effect, prevent racist isolationism
in both the North and South:
It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at.
pleasure, who cannot. buy and sell, who cannot enforce his
rights. These are rights which the first clause of the constitu-
tional amendment meant to secure to all; and to prevent the
very cavil which the Senator from Delaware suggests today,
that Congress would not have the power to secure them, the
second section of the amendment was added. 402
Even after the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification, states clandes-
tinely evaded the Amendment's grant of freedom and placed legal
barriers limiting freedpeople's movement.40
In 1865 and 1866, all former Confederate States, except Tennessee
and Arkansas, passed sweeping vagrancy laws. 404 These made any poor
man who did not have a labor contract subject to discretionary ar-
rest.4°5 Vagrancy laws disproportionately targeted unemployed blacks
and were designed to keep them from leaving their former masters'
plantations.40 Some Southern cities enacted similar ordinances de-
signed to thwart black movement. The mayor of Mobile, Alabama
warned vagrants that if they did not find employment or leave that city,
they would be arrested and forced to work on public streets. 407 Other
towns had similar punishments to prevent blacks from staying in urban
areas. Nashville, Tennessee and New Orleans, Louisiana sent black "va-
4°0 Id.
40 Id.
402 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
400 William Cohen, Negrn hrvaluntary Servitude in the Sarah, 1863-1940: A Preliminary
Analysis, 42 J. S. HINT. 31,47 (1976).
404 Id.
405
406 Id. at 33-34.
407
 LrtwActi, supra note 181, at 318-19.
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grants" to workhouses. 408 San Antonio, Texas and Montgomery, Ala-
bama required that they work on the streets to pay for the expense of
keeping them in jails. 4°9 In a move reminiscent of the antebellum sys-
tem of passes, without which slaves could not leave their masters' prop-
erty, some cities arrested any blacks who stayed out on the streets after
curfew without their employer's permission:" This scheme was meant
as much to inhibit blacks from intrastate and interstate travel as it was
to perpetuate a system of involuntary servitude.*"
The Court has recognized that the right to travel is "firmly estab-
lished and repeatedly recognized."412 Similar to the family privacy cases,
the Court has found support for protecting the right to travel in a vari-
ety of constitutional provisions, including the Privileges and Mummi-
fies Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Commerce Clause:"
Shapiro v. Thompson involved a state welfare-eligibility provision that
imposed a one-year residency requirement:" The Court ruled that ab-
sent a compelling interest, state interference with the fundamental
right to travel violated the Equal Protection Clause:" In another case,
Saenz v. Roe, dealing with the availability of welfare benefits to persons
who recently moved to a new state, the Court ruled that prohibitions
on the right to travel violated the constitutionally guaranteed privileges
and immunities of newly arrived citizens.'" The Court majority in
United States u Guest found that the constitutional right to travel "and
necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate
408 Id. at 319.
409 id.
410 id .
4" Sec Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can't Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in Postbellum
America, 781 Am, 1265, 1293 (1992) ("Under the vagrancy laws, the state enforced
the sale of labor—through an involuntary exchange—wherever beggars contrived to avoid
the natural sanctions of hunger and cold.").
410 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745. 757 (1966).
419
	 v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489. 501 (1999) (concluding the right to travel derives from
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2); Guest, 383 U.S. at 758-59
(concluding the right to travel exists in the Commerce Clause's protection of free move-
ment); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (indicating the right to travel exists in the
Fifth Amendment); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96-97 (1908) (concluding the right
to travel derives from the Fourteenth Amendment); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
180 (1869) (concluding the right to travel derives from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, section 2).
414 394 U.S. at 629-31.
4 " Id. at 638; sec also id. at 657 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court basically
relies upon the equal protection ground").
416 526 U.S. at 502-03,509-11.
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conunerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept
of our Federal Union."4 " The majority linked the right to travel to the
Commerce Clause because it regarded "the constitutional right of in-
terstate travel [as] a right secured against interference from any source
whatever, whether governmental or private.... that is quite independ-
ent of the Fourteenth Amendment." 418 The Court's preference for the
Commerce Clause as the source of the right to travel again artificially
linked a fundamental right to an economic power rather than to a hu-
man interest existing independently of governmental powers.
Of course, it is accurate that limits on travel can be both detri-
mental to commerce and violate citizens' privileges and immunities,
but, to date, the Supreme Court has inadequately examined the con-
nection between slavery and restraints on movement. A Thirteenth
Amendment approach on the right to free travel adds a needed
reflection on whether impediments to free movement resemble the
burdens of involuntary servitude. This approach recognizes that some
extreme burdens on the right to move about freely can resemble the
constraints of enslavement.
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the Court nearly acknowledged the con-
nection between the Thirteenth Amendment and right to travel, but
failed to make the logical connection between them. 419 The case dealt
with a racially motivated assault perpetrated on a public highway. 420 In
his opinion, Justice Potter Stewart referred to several right-to-travel
cases, including Shapiro, and found that "[o] ur cases have firmly estab-
lished that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected,
does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is as-
sertable against private as well as governmental interference. "421 Fur-
thermore, Justice Stewart determined that Congress had the power to
create a cause of action against private, racially motivated conspiracies
under § 1985(3), the Ku Klux Klan Act. 422
417 383 U.S. at 757. justice John Harlan, who concurred in part and dissented in part
to the Guest opinion, found there was a right to travel in two constitutional provisions: "It is
accordingly apparent that the right to unimpeded interstate travel [is] regarded as a privi-
lege and immunity of national citizenship.... A second possible constitutional basis for
the right to move among the States without interference is the Commerce Clause." Id. at
767 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
418 .M. at 759 n.17.
419 See generally 903 U.S. 88 (1971).
420 Id. at 89-92.
421 Id. at 102,105-06.
122 See id. at 104.
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In later years, the Court explained that "the conspiracy at issue [in
Griffin) was actionable because it was aimed at depriving the plaintiffs of
rights protected by the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."423 The clear indication in
Griffin is that the right to travel and the Thirteenth Amendment granted
Congress the authority to pass the Ku Klux Klan Act, thereby providing
redress against individual conspiracies that interfere with movement—
even absent a state action, negative effects on commerce, or interference
with the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. The case is
unclear, however, as to why the right to travel should be separated from
core Thirteenth Amendment interests. This dichotomy is particularly
obscure because Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, in part, pursuant
to the Thirteenth Amendment. 424 The Amendment, therefore, was a
logical place for the Court to find congressional power to prohibit con-
spirators from interfering with citizens' right to travel.
The Court has located the right to travel in so many constitutional
provisions because, like family autonomy, it is a fundamental interest
that the state must protect. The right to live free of arbitrary impedi-
ments that prevent the enjoyment of such interests sometimes impli-
cates the protection of the Thirteenth Amendment. Securing "the
blessings of liberty" is a national aspiration to which the Preamble to
the Constitution commits the federal government. The Amendment
made that national aspiration enforceable against state and private in-
fringements. The Amendment enhances, clarifies, and enforces con-
temporary civil rights decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Thirteenth Amendment continues to be a source of sweep-
ing constitutional power for enacting federal civil rights legislation.
This Article suggests a progressive Thirteenth Amendment theory
that relies on existing precedents and abolitionist aspirations. The
Amendment drastically altered the Constitution and became the legal
causeway from slavery to freedom. 425 Its first section eliminated, or
4" United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825.832-33 (1983).
424 Griffin established at least two constitutional bases for the Ku Klux Klan Act. Those
are the Thirteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-07.
425 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONS11FUTIONAL FA MI 139 (1988) ("The conflict of 1861,
among other things, divides our constitutional history, and some historians refer to the
`first' and 'second' Constitutions. The first Constitution—that of 1787—was predicated,
among other things, on federalism and recognition of slavery; the second Constitution, on
an enhanced national government and individual liberty.").
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more euphemistically amended, all the federalist provisions of the
1787 Constitution that protected slavery. The Amendment's second
section provided the U.S. Congress with the power to protect individ-
ual rights and thereby better the nation. Accordingly, the Thirteenth
Amendment secured two fundamental principles, which both ema-
nated from the Preamble. The first principle protects the right to un-
obtrusive autonomy in carrying out deliberative decisions. The sec-
ond principle limits autonomy whenever it arbitrarily interferes with
other citizens' sense of purpose. The guarantee of freedom protects
individual choices as long as they do not infringe on the coequal lib-
erty rights of others. This approach balances autonomy with welfare
to achieve a liberating sense of mutual purpose for civil society.
The Thirteenth Amendment, thus, not only ended slavery but.
also created a substantive assurance of freedom. It prohibits all the
vestiges of involuntary slavery, whether imposed by public or private
actors, and grants Congress the right to enact laws, making "universal
liberty" a matter of national concern, not merely of state prerogative.
The Thirteenth Amendment not only secures delineated civil free-
doms, such as those specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but
also secures freedom from all forms of arbitrary domination. In this
regard, legislative initiatives must balance individual liberties against.
the national interests of a diverse but equally free people. The En-
forcement Clause of the Thirteenth Antendment provides lawmakers
with the power to craft laws tied to the Declaration of Independence's
ideal of a free and equal citizenry. The Framers of the Thirteenth
Amendment refined that idea to include persons of all races. 426
The Thirteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee is expansive
enough for each generation to abolish continued coercive practices,
not just those the Thirty-Eighth Congress recognized when it debated
the Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, the range of liberty rights the
Thirteenth Amendment secures is just as broad as those the Due Proc-
ess Clause guarantees. Accordingly, Justice Harlan's description of a
broad concept of freedom in the context of the Due Process Clause
bears striking resemblance to the description of freedom his grandfa-
425 The Republican Party's decision after the Civil War to use the language of the pa.
triarchal family structure helped maintain some of the unequal civil structure that existed
in antebellum U.S. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDER STRIFE AND CoNEUsloN: THE Pouri-
CAL CULTURE OF RialoNsTRucrtox 184-85 (1997). On the decision of the women's rights
movements to move front joining race and gender issues to an insistence of specific gender
rights, see generally Ellen C. DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights.
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, 743. Ass. Nisi.. 846 (1987).
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ther expounded in the dissents to the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy u
Ferguson, and Hodges u United Slates. Our nation, Harlan wrote in dissent
to Poe v. Ullman, balances
respect for the liberty of the individual	 and the demands
of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Consti-
tutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it
certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having re-
gard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing.... Pi he imperative character of
Constitutional provisions ... must be discerned from a par-
ticular provision's larger context.. . . 'ELJiberty' is not a series
of isolated points pricked out. in terms of the taking of prop-
erty; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to
keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which,
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbi-
trary impositions and purposeless restraints ... . 427
427 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Compare Justice Harlan's
statement from Poe with his grandfather's arguments in other dissents. For example, in the
Civil Rights Cases, his grandfather stated:
[T] he power conferred by the thirteenth amendment does not rest upon im-
plication or inference. Those who framed it were not ignorant of the discus-
sion, covering many years of the country's history, as to the constitutional
power of congress to enact the fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850. When.
therefore, it was determined, by a change in the fundamental law to uproot
the institution of slavery wherever it existed in this land, and to establish uni-
versal freedom. there was a fixed purpose to place the power of congress in the
premises beyond the possibility of doubt.
109 U.S. 3,33-34 (1883) (emphasis added) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Messy,
he wrote:
The thirteenth amendment does not permit the withholding or the depriva-
tion of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not only struck down the
institution of slavery as previously existing in the United States, but it prevents
the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery
or servitude. It decreed universal civil freedom in this country.... The sure
guaranty of the peace and security of each race is the clear, distinct, uncondi-
tional recognition by our governments, National and State, of every right that
inheres in civil freedom, and of the equality before the law of all citizens of
the United States without regard to race.
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The constitutional right, to freedom, then, is linked to this country's
struggle to break with racial enslavement and to its moral growth
through the Reconstruction Amendments.
The Thirteenth Amenchnent prohibits all repressive conduct ra-
tionally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply racist la-
bor practices. 428 The Amendment's protections apply to anyone who
is subject to arbitrary restraints against the enjoyment of freedom.
Congress must only find that those restraints resemble the badges and
incidents of involuntary servitude. Laws passed pursuant to the Thir-
teenth Amendment should protect free and equal persons' concep-
tions of, and quests for, qualitatively good lives. Masters had sup-
pressed slaves' life aspirations, prohibiting them from entering 'into
marital contracts, from choosing professions, and from making a host
of other important life decisions. Slavery devalued the commitment of
our pluralistic society to respect. the individual and collective right to
live free of arbitrary intrusion on freedom. Consequently, laws passed
under Section 2 against any badges of involuntary servitude must
make it easier for people to express their individuality and prevent
arbitrarily domineering private and state actions.
The Thirteenth Amendment's legislative process must reflect on
the nation's history to evaluate whether the U.S. has cleansed itself of
all vestiges of involuntary servitude. With those vestiges that remain,
163 U.S. 537, 555, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J.. dissenting). And in Hodges, he said that the Thir-
teenth Amendment
conferred upon every person within the jurisdiction of the United Stales (ex-
cept those legally imprisoned for crime) the right. without discrimination
against them on account of their race, to enjoy all the privileges that inhere
in freedom. It went further, however, and by its second section, invested Con-
gress with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce its provisions.... It
may be also observed that the freedom created and established by the Thir-
teenth Amendment was further protected against assault when the Four-
teenth Amendment became a part of the supreme law of the land; for that
Amendment provided that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without clue process of law. To deprive any person of a privilege in-
hering in the freedom ordained and established by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment is to deprive hint of a privilege inhering in the liberty recognized by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
203 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1906).
428
 The Abolition Amendment freed slaves from much more than their obligation to
engage in unrequited labor. It ended all incidents of servitude such as the forced limita-
tions on slaves' right to practice religion, hire out their labor. and leave their plantations
without permission. Cf. IZ-ENNET/I NI, STAmee, THE PECULIAR INSTITU'llON: SLAVERV 'rim
ANTE-BELLUM Soum 208 (1956).
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expiation must come from enacting, and then enforcing, laws ration-
ally designed to end the oppressions.
An evolving understanding of how best to protect fundamental
rights and improve social harmony should inform congressional and
judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Such an aim
comports with the Preamble's assertion that the national govern-
ment's purpose is to secure the blessing of liberty and to promote the
general welfare. Civil rights laws should be passed and judged pursu-
ant to this dual purpose of national government.
Congress thus far has done little to fulfill its role under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, and only a handful of cases interpret it. With only
a smattering of meaningful laws passed to effectuate the Amendment,
its potency remains minimal but its potential is great. In spite of more
than a century of virtual neglect, the Amendment has a deep-reaching
effect on the constitutional significance of liberty.
At a time of judicial activism, which has resulted in narrowly con-
strued congressional Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 powers, Jones v. Alfred H. Moyer Co. and the handful of cases
it engendered remain wholly intact. Jones's ruling that the Thirteenth
Amendment grants Congress broad power to pass necessary and
proper laws rationally related to the incidents of servitude is still vir-
tually untapped. The Thirteenth Amendment is uniquely suited for
combating contemporary infringements against civil liberties, some of
which I discuss elsewhere. 429 It reaches private acts of discrimination,
which the Rehnquist Court asserted Congress cannot regulate under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is not subject to the
"economic enterprise" interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court
has recently associated with the Commerce Clause.
4 29 Federal prohibitions against hate crimes, state use of confederate symbols, and the
enslavement of migrant farmers are some of the proposals I make in TSESIS, supra note 11,
at ch. 7. See also Tsesis, supra note 3, at 545-58.
